

## THE DEMOCRATIC UNION FOR THE REPUBLIC: TO SURVIVE DE GAULLE

by John S. Ambler

As Secretary-General of the young Union for the New Republic (UNR)<sup>1</sup> in May, 1959, Albin Chalandon described a predicament which undoubtedly has frustrated numerous Gaullist leaders in recent years. "General de Gaulle is our clandestine chief," said Chalandon. "Our position is a little like that of secret agents who owe total obedience to their military chief, who himself does not hesitate to disavow them when things go badly."<sup>2</sup> Chalandon found himself executive head of a party created to support a man who had no faith in parties, who was reluctant to acknowledge or identify himself with his party supporters, and almost as reluctant to reward them with power and public office. Insofar as they accept the Gaullist view of the state, Chalandon and his successors have produced a party which is suspicious of partisanship, if not of politics. Here lies one of the paradoxes of the party which holds many of the keys to future political stability in France. Another related paradox is Gaullism's blend of a modern style with lingering strains of traditional antirepublicanism.

The views of its mentor, its doctrine and style, its composition, its pattern of development, and its organization all provide clues to the character and prospects of that movement which hopes to *survivre à de Gaulle*. We shall examine each of these, then, in a concluding section, attempt to sharpen our analysis of the problems of the present Gaullist party, the Union Démocratique pour la République (UDR), by comparing it with modern "catchall" parties in other major democracies.

### I. *De Gaulle on Political Parties*

Given the markedly negative connotations of "party politician" in France in the first years of the Fifth Republic, and the danger of alienating voters

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who identified with traditional parties, Charles de Gaulle might well have chosen an above-party posture simply out of tactical considerations. In fact, his aloofness from parties — including his own — was more deeply rooted. From the fall of France in 1940 down to the present day, de Gaulle time and again has expressed his contempt for the traditional parties — the “*partis de jadis*” — whose “decadence,” whose attachment to selfish minority interests, whose divisiveness and quarrelsomeness, whose inability to govern, whose reluctance to renounce the “sterile games” of the “*régime des partis*,” undermined the solidarity, the stability, and the greatness of the French nation, and, he argues, led directly to the fall of France in 1940 and again to the Algerian crisis of May, 1958.<sup>3</sup>

In his famous Bayeux speech of June 16, 1946 (later adopted by the UNR as one of its major doctrinal statements), de Gaulle seemed to accept such parties as endemic to France: “In brief, the rivalry of parties in our country takes on a fundamental character that sets everything adrift and very often wrecks the superior interests of the country. This is an obvious fact which is due to our national temperament, to the accidents of our history, and to the disturbances of today, but which our institutions must take into consideration in order to preserve the respect for law, the cohesion of governments, the efficiency of administrations, and the prestige and authority of the state.”<sup>4</sup> The remedy, he argued, must be institutional and must come from outside the party system. The executive must cease to be “merely a delegate of his party”; he must be independent, powerful, and capable of protecting the national interest against the onslaught of self-interested elites both inside and outside the parties. As early as September, 1944, de Gaulle sensed the reservations, the private ambitions, of “‘politicians,’ new and old,” and concluded—in traditional Bonapartist fashion—that “more than ever, then, I had to seek support from the French people rather than from the ‘elite’ groups which tended to come between us.”<sup>5</sup> For de Gaulle, apparently only the national leader, in mystic or plebiscitary contact with “the people,” is capable of perceiving and defending the national interest.

De Gaulle rarely has seen fit to exempt even Gaullist parties from the mistrusted category of “intermediary bodies.” Twice during the Fourth Republic he placed hope in a political party and in both instances felt himself betrayed. As Premier of the provisional French government for eighteen months following the liberation of France, de Gaulle enjoyed strong and consistent support from the newly organized *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (MRP), the French Christian Democratic Party, which in 1945 proudly declared itself to be the “*parti de la fidélité*” to de Gaulle.<sup>6</sup> When de Gaulle resigned in January, 1946, in protest over the reluctance of the Socialist and Communist parties to follow his lead, however, the MRP, in-

stead of demanding submission to de Gaulle, facilitated the creation of a successor government by joining a tripartite coalition with the Communist Party and the Socialist Party. MRP leaders explained that were they to refuse participation, the Communists might well seize control of the executive. Unconvinced and embittered, de Gaulle dismissed the MRP leaders as unfaithful allies, either inspired by narrow partisan ambitions or, at best, weak men trapped already by "the system." The breach widened when MRP leaders supported the second draft constitution in the referendum of October, 1946 — despite de Gaulle's strong opposition — and again in the spring of 1947, when the party forbade its members and officeholders from taking joint membership in de Gaulle's newly formed *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (RPF).

Persuaded that the princes of the new *régime des partis* would never effect from within those reforms necessary to restore French political unity and authority, de Gaulle determined in the spring of 1947 to create a broad new political organization, the RPF, whose specific mission would be to reform the French state. As its name implied, the RPF was intended not to be simply another party, adding further to the political divisions of an already divided nation. It was intended to bring together men of various parties in a common effort for political reform. The device of "double membership" proved ineffective, however, as Socialists and Popular Republicans were forbidden by their parties to affiliate, and many of those Radicals and Moderates who were eager to restore with the Gaullist label their prestige lost in the war quickly balked when asked also to accept Gaullist discipline.<sup>7</sup> A strong Gaullist vote of almost 40 percent in the municipal elections of 1947 faded to 23 percent and 120 Assembly seats in the legislative elections of June, 1951. Within two years thereafter, de Gaulle had disassociated himself from his deputies. With few exceptions, designed to split the opposition, the General had determined that there should be no collaboration with other parties until the constitution had been revised. As power within the National Assembly shifted to the Right, however — and especially when Antoine Pinay became Prime Minister in 1952 — the temptation to play the parliamentary game proved irresistible to many on the RFP benches. Again de Gaulle felt himself betrayed — this time by deputies who rode to office on his own good name.

When crumbling political authority at home and a full scale revolt in Algeria forced the National Assembly to recall de Gaulle in June, 1958, he was understandably reluctant to tie his fate to another Gaullist party. The *Union pour la Nouvelle République* was the creation of Gaullists, but not of de Gaulle, who before the elections of November, 1958, forbade any party from using his name, even as an adjective. Only when he became fearful of being crippled by a hostile parliamentary majority in the elections of

November, 1962 — and then only momentarily and obliquely, without mentioning the name of the UNR — did de Gaulle descend from the heights of *apolitisme* to call upon French voters to “confirm” their recent referendum vote for popular election of the President by electing his supporters.<sup>8</sup> In local elections de Gaulle has remained silent. In his own presidential election of December, 1965, he made no mention of the UNR. He shuns all party meetings and takes only a very indirect hand in such critical matters as party doctrine and organization. He attempted to give the cabinet a distinctly nonpartisan character. Only in the legislative elections of March, 1967, did he begin to play the part of a party leader.

Herein lies one of the major paradoxes of the Gaullist party: it was designed to support and to survive a leader who doubts the legitimate role of political parties in the democratic process. As we shall see, many of its difficulties stem from this predicament.

## II. *Style and Doctrine*

Clearly one of the preeminent characteristics of de Gaulle as a political leader is his blend of fixity in objectives (the greatness of France) with great flexibility in choice of means. A party created to support such a leader is faced with unusual problems of doctrinal and programmatic consistency. Gaullists who, under the Fourth Republic, had believed Algeria to be forever French, for example, watched in dismay as the General moved toward a settlement which granted “association” in name and independence in fact to that North African territory. Understandably, de Gaulle is reluctant to allow a Gaullist party to commit itself to any beliefs or programs which might limit his flexibility. Hence, like de Gaulle himself, the UDR can be characterized not so much by its program as by its style, the major elements of which are professed nonpartisanship, pragmatism, efficiency, and modernism.

Following the example of the master, Jacques Baumel, as Secretary-General of the UNR, asserted that “the vocation of Gaullism is not to be a political party, but to bring together Frenchmen.”<sup>9</sup> UNR recruitment literature reiterated the theme that “the UNR is not a party, particularly not a party like the others.”<sup>10</sup> It is rather “the union of Frenchmen and Frenchwomen, of all origins, determined to support, without the spirit of party, the action of General de Gaulle and pursue his work within the framework of the Fifth Republic.”<sup>11</sup>

Faced with the organizational and electoral tasks of a political party, however, the UNR and its successor, the UDR, find themselves caught in embarrassing contradictions in their effort to create an above-party image. In the cantonal elections of March, 1964, for example, the UNR headquarters in Paris compiled a “Candidate’s Dossier” in which a curious mix



of "major themes of our campaign" are laid out. On the one hand, candidates are advised to stress such slogans as: "No politics in the General Councils," and "The cantonal elections are elections of persons," while, on the other hand, repeating such partisan mottos as: "Chase out the Communists, foreign agents," "Eliminate the men of the Fourth Republic," and "Only the Gaullists can hold back the Popular Front."<sup>12</sup> The municipal elections of March, 1965, again involved the UNR in similar contradictions.<sup>13</sup>

Joined to the nonpartisan image in the speeches and writings of the Gaullist leaders is the recurrent insistence that the Gaullist party — in contrast to the doctrinaire incompetence of the traditional parties — is interested primarily in the pragmatic and efficient solution of concrete problems. When critics argue that the UDR has no doctrine, Gaullist leaders often reply that the country has had enough ideological warfare; what is needed now, as former Secretary-General Jacques Baumel put it, is a "practical approach to the great problems, a sense of the real and the concrete, to the exclusion of all ideology and of all a-priorism."<sup>14</sup> "The problems are much more technical than political," added Baumel in early 1965.<sup>15</sup> Gaullist deputies are no longer harangued by their leaders in the traditional oratorical style, we are told. Rather, they are "invited to model their behavior on the example of a business manager charged with DIRECTING with the goal of PRODUCING."<sup>16</sup> The mutual appeal of the UDR and the managerial personnel in the larger private industries probably owes much to the movement's respect for technocracy and efficiency.<sup>17</sup>

In its own organizational efforts, the UDR exploits modern techniques in an attempt both at efficiency and at distinguishing itself from the *partis de jadis*. Party workers are trained in public relations techniques, and aid is purchased from such professional public relations firms as Services et Méthodes.<sup>18</sup> Outside experts are brought into national congresses to lend a professional, technical air to the deliberations. Colloquia on specific problems, again with experts invited, are held in various cities throughout the country.

Without doubt the emphasis upon the efficient solution of concrete problems has real advantages for a party which hopes to create a modern, non-ideological, classless image. Yet an emphasis upon technocracy leaves unanswered the essential political questions of who will decide, and by what standards, upon priorities in policy goals and in the distribution of the national income.

Although clearly the UDR has introduced a new style in French politics, its uniqueness is not restricted to style. One must be cautious in talking of the beliefs of Gaullists in the absence of precise data, yet it would appear on the basis of documentary evidence that most Gaullist leaders share at least three attitudes, in addition to their loyalty to de Gaulle: they are

French nationalists; they believe in a strong, stable state, built around a strong executive who represents the national interest; and they consider themselves to be modern and progressive in comparison with the "prophets of the past" of the traditional parties.<sup>19</sup>

If Gaullism means anything more than simple obedience to de Gaulle, certainly it means attachment to the General's "*certaine idée de la France*," to the notion of an active and independent French role in world affairs. "... France is not really herself unless in the front rank," writes de Gaulle in the first paragraph of his *War Memoirs*. "... [O]nly vast enterprises are capable of counterbalancing the ferments of dispersal which are inherent in her people; ... our country, as it is, surrounded by the others, as they are, must aim high and hold itself straight, on pain of mortal danger. In short, to my mind, France cannot be France without greatness."<sup>20</sup> In a similar vein, in the conclusion to his book, *Au Service de la Nation*, former Gaullist Prime Minister Michel Debré writes, "The doctrine of this work, as the reader can verify, is a national doctrine. Its first principle is the existence of the French Nation. Its first objective is the independence, the progress, the prestige of that nation."<sup>21</sup> Similarly for former cabinet minister Edmond Michelet (one of the purest of the Gaullist "*inconditionnels*"), for former Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, and even for most of the "Gaullists of the Left," Gaullism is at least in part a form of nationalism.<sup>22</sup> To be sure, the Algerian problem demonstrated that the Gaullist notion of grandeur is sufficiently vague to permit conflicting interpretations.

Secondly, and in part in order to allow the French nation to play its proper role, Gaullists from 1946 onward have insisted on replacement of stalemate assembly government with new institutions centering on a strong executive. This was the doctrine — in fact the *raison d'être* — of the RPF. In turn the UNR, in its first National Congress in November, 1959, adopted the following resolution: "The fundamental doctrine of the Union for the New Republic has its sources in the Bayeux speech of 1946, where are defined the major designs for a restoration of the state, founded upon separation and balance of powers."<sup>23</sup> Though Gaullists believe that French society must remain liberal and pluralistic, they believe in the necessity of an independent president, created to serve as arbiter between rival interests, as guardian of the national interest, and as a constant check upon partisan ambitions. The constitutional amendment of 1962 — generally accepted by Gaullists — added popular election of the president to the Gaullist constitutional creed. Again, even the Gaullists of the Left (the former *Union Démocratique du Travail*) agree with this party stand, though at times they wish the government had more faith in representative associations, both political and economic.<sup>24</sup>

A third doctrinal link in the Gaullist chain is commitment to moderniza-

tion — political, economic, and military. "For me, the [Gaullist] adventure is essentially the march toward the future," writes Edmond Michelet.<sup>25</sup> The UNR is the "*formation de l'avenir*," announces a party pamphlet.<sup>26</sup> "The profound thought of General de Gaulle can be expressed in a few words: 'renewal of French institutions,'" declared Albin Chalandon, the UNR's second Secretary-General.<sup>27</sup> Throughout party declarations runs this consistent theme: the UNR is a dynamic movement whose mission is to "construct the new France,"<sup>28</sup> to "lead this country toward the destinies of the Twenty-First Century."<sup>29</sup> One of the party's publications was baptised *La Nouvelle Frontière*, as evidence of the Gaullists' commitment to getting their own country moving. Rapid economic expansion, greater social justice, the application of modern techniques in the reform of French institutions, rapid population growth — all of these goals make of the Gaullist party a party of movement as well as a party of order, setting it far apart from the stalemate or reactionary parties of the traditional Right.

When one proceeds to more specific questions of social and economic policy, however, the Gaullist consensus very nearly collapses. Here Gaullist attitudes range from *laissez-faire* noninterventionism to democratic socialism. On the left are those like the leaders of the *Union Démocratique de Travail* (joined with the UNR in December, 1962), and of the *Action Ouvrière et Professionnelle* within the UNR, many of whom continue to view Gaullism as "a socialism adapted to our old civilization,"<sup>30</sup> as "the only socialism which has wed its century."<sup>31</sup> Gaullists of this persuasion like to recall that it was the de Gaulle government of 1944-1946 which initiated state economic planning, which established France's first comprehensive social security system, and which nationalized the coal mines, gas and electricity, civil aviation, the merchant navy, four of the largest banks, and the Renault automobile factories. They recall that one of the central themes of RPF propaganda was the "association of capital and labor" through profit sharing and through institutionalized collective bargaining. Understandably, they reacted with dismay and alarm when de Gaulle returned from political exile and entrusted the powerful Ministry of Finance from 1958 to January, 1966, first to Antoine Pinay and next to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing — neither of whom was a UNR member and both of whom were relatively orthodox economists whose primary concern was with preventing inflation, even at the cost of freezing wages and delaying social welfare reforms.

Since de Gaulle has limited interest in economic questions, his followers have few guidelines around which to rally. All tend to agree with Michel Debré that economic expansion and some redistribution of income through welfare state programs are essential to that social solidarity which in turn is a prerequisite of national greatness.<sup>32</sup> As early as November, 1959, the

first UNR national congress resolved that "the UNR manifests its determination to carry through the abolition of the proletarian condition, thus escaping the capitalist-Marxist dilemma."<sup>33</sup> Gaullists often disagree, however, as to whether social progress ought also to be an important Gaullist goal in its own right, as to the appropriate pace of reform, and as to the proper role of interested groups (particularly labor unions) in the planning process. Fearful that the UNR, once having decimated the parties of the traditional Right (as it did in the legislative elections of 1962), might simply absorb their economic views along with their voters, Gaullists of a reformist bent have carried on a sustained campaign to get on with programs for redistribution of national income.<sup>34</sup> This lack of consensus among Gaullists regarding social and economic policy presents one of the UDR's most serious problems in its effort to survive de Gaulle.

If, as has been argued above, there exists a minimal consensus among Gaullists apart from simple fidelity, where should they then be placed on the French political spectrum? Despite protests from Gaullist leaders, it seems clear that the electorate thought of the UNR as a party of the Right. In a national survey conducted by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP) in December, 1962, 55 percent of the respondents labeled the UNR as "Right," as opposed to 4 percent who viewed it as "Left," 22 percent as "Center," and 19 percent who expressed no opinion.<sup>35</sup> In contrast, only 44 percent of all respondents felt the Popular Republican Movement (MRP) to be "Right," and — surprisingly — only 39 percent so labeled the Independents.

Looking beyond survey data, the answer to the "Right-Left" question depends in good part upon the criteria which one applies, for French attitudes and ideologies rarely fit neatly into a spectral frame. Tested by the traditional "red-black" criterion, Gaullist support for government subsidies to Catholic schools in 1951 and 1959 place the RPF and the UNR on the moderate Right, though a vigorous minority of Gaullists opposed subsidies of any kind. However, given the numerous Protestants and Jews in its ranks, and given de Gaulle's suspicion of all private interests — including the Church — the UDR clearly cannot be classified as a confessional party.<sup>36</sup> It is significant that the law of December, 1967, which liberalized legal prohibitions on birth control, was initiated by a prominent Gaullist deputy, Lucien Neuwirth, and voted into law with the acceptance of the government.

A second popular criterion distinguishes parties according to their attitude toward governmental institutions, with the Left representing strong suspicion of the powerful state generally and of the strong executive in particular. Again, with its marked repugnance to assembly government and its constant defense of a strong, independent executive, Gaullism clearly

belongs to the Right. The institutional reforms written into the constitution of the Fifth Republic were similar to those which had been proposed from the Right for three-quarters of a century.<sup>37</sup> Again, however, the criterion is of dubious value. The Radical-Socialist ideal of weak, assembly government was born in the era of the "stalemate society," when most Frenchmen feared political change, and when the strong executives in recent memory were all antidemocratic.<sup>38</sup> The Jacobins, it must be recalled, were believers in strong government; and present-day socialists clearly would need a strong executive if ever they were in a position (and still inclined) to implement their creed.

If Gaullism is to the Right in its attitudes toward the state, its affinity is with the Bonapartist tradition more than with recent French parties of the Right.<sup>39</sup> In its heterogeneous clientele, in its suspicion of parliaments and of intermediary bodies generally, in its reliance on the plebiscite, in its combination of stability and progress — in all of these respects Gaullism belongs in the Bonapartist tradition. Yet the analogy must not be exaggerated. Gaullists are committed to democratic rights and freedoms in a way which clearly sets them apart from nineteenth-century Bonapartists, as does their passion for modernization. Moreover, though still passionately nationalistic, Gaullists evidence few imperialist pretensions; indeed, it was de Gaulle who presided over the dismantling of the French Empire.

In the test of economic policy — capitalism versus socialism — Gaullism wins a more mixed rating, partly because of its ambivalent stand. Bankers, businessmen, and orthodox economists have had strong influence in the Fifth Republic.<sup>40</sup> Indeed, as a dynamic movement intent upon encouraging economic efficiency and expansion, Gaullism finds itself drawn to large, modern enterprises, and badly estranged from small marginal producers and all on the political Center and Right who for generations have rigidly defended vested interests. Nonetheless, the nationalization of industries under the first de Gaulle government, the insistence of Gaullists on controlling vested interests of all sorts, the Gaullist experiments with schemes for improving labor-management relations (usually against business protests), the frequent pledges of greater social justice, and the existence of a strong Left wing within the movement — all of these facts suggest that the UNR is not simply a modern capitalist party.

When one takes foreign policy as the test of "Leftism," Gaullism falls more to the Left than to the Right. Though vehemently opposed to domestic communism, and clearly aligned with the West in time of crisis, France under de Gaulle has outdone the democratic Left in France in freeing the colonies, establishing French independence from the United States and encouraging others to do likewise, withdrawing from NATO, and seeking a *rapprochement* with Eastern Europe and with the U.S.S.R.<sup>41</sup>



As the present organizational bearer of the Gaullist movement, the UDR, all criteria considered, is not easily identifiable on a Left-Right spectrum. In good measure it is indeed, as Prime Minister Pompidou told the UNR National Council in June, 1966, "the synthesis of the Left and the Right, of order and movement,"<sup>42</sup> It is as well a blend of statism and democracy, of nationalism and realism. If eventually the UDR finds its home on the Right-Center (as appears likely), French conservatism will emerge transformed.<sup>43</sup>

### III. *Leaders and Voters*

De Gaulle frequently is quoted as once having said that "everybody in France has been, is, or will be, a Gaullist." Both their quest for national unity and their desire to preserve the Fifth Republic impose upon Gaullists the task of seeking ever larger electoral majorities. Indeed, in the course of de Gaulle's long career, most Frenchmen from the extreme Left to the extreme Right have found some point at which they accepted him as a champion — be it with the wartime resistance, or with the RPF against the *régime des partis*, or in apparent defense of French Algeria in 1958, or subsequently as the grantor of Algerian independence and the defender against the Secret Army Organization.

The most consistent Gaullists, however, have been predominantly certain of those *compagnons* whose loyalty dates from 1940. In an assertion of party unity in 1963, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou characteristically argued that "... our solidarity was born first from our past, from the combat begun twenty-three years ago by General de Gaulle, a combat in which we joined in order to save the honor of France, to associate her with victory, to define the roads to salvation and finally to assume her leadership."<sup>44</sup> In his book, *Le Gaullisme, Passionante Aventure*, Edmond Michelet stresses the more personal, sentimental ties of Gaullism for *inconditionnels* like himself: "I will suggest that one of the most profound reasons for our attachment to the man of June 18 stems, more than from that complicity in contemptuous refusal of defeat which animated him and us, from that human solidarity which was born among the first *compagnons* who shared his solitude."<sup>45</sup> These are the men — like Roger Frey, Michel Debré, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Christian Fouchet, Michel Maurice-Bokanowski, André Malraux, Pierre Billotte, Jacques Baumel, Edmond Michelet, Gaston Palewski, and others — who followed de Gaulle through the war, the RPF, and into prominent position in the Fifth Republic.

Of the 198 UNR deputies elected in 1958, 112 — slightly more than the Assembly average — had resistance records.<sup>46</sup> In the second Assembly of the Fifth Republic, as of April, 1965, sixteen of the 215 UNR deputies were *Compagnons de la Libération*, forty-eight held the *Médaille de la Résistance*, and fourteen held other resistance medals, for a total of 36 percent,



as opposed to 17 percent comparable medal holders within the Rassemblement Démocratique (a Radical reincarnation).<sup>47</sup> The number of UNR medal holders was particularly impressive in view of the youth of the UNR deputies, many of whom were too young to have been in the resistance.

If former resistants are numerous among Gaullist deputies, they have been even more common within the cabinet, and until recently had almost monopolistic control over the leadership of the UNR national organization. Among the twenty-six French ministers and secretaries of state in March, 1965, six were members of the prestigious order of *Compagnons de la Libération*, and another nine held the *Médaille de la Résistance*. Until 1967 the key party decision-makers — Roger Frey, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Michel Debré, and Jacques Baumel among them — were almost all out of the resistance.<sup>48</sup>

To be sure, not all resistance heroes are Gaullists, and not all Gaullists leaders are resistance heroes. Yet within the UNR, those without resistance credentials (preferably Free French credentials) are always slightly suspect in the eyes of the old faithfuls. "In the world of Gaullism," writes Edmond Michelet, "there are the '*compagnons*' and those who are not *compagnons*, have never been and will never be. When the RPF was at its highest tide, it attracted a certain number of members who adorned themselves with the title of *compagnon* only out of opportunism."<sup>49</sup> As a governing party (at least in theory), the UNR undoubtedly has attracted more such "opportunists." And even the new faithful are tiring of interminable references to a resistance which took place a generation ago.<sup>50</sup>

After the Algerian War, there appeared increasing evidence of a changing of the guard within the Gaullist movement, as the UNR searched out able young candidates to appeal to the unusually young French electorate of the 1960's. Jean Charlot has calculated that "new Gaullists" — men without resistance decorations and without Gaullist leadership experience in the Fourth Republic — represented 29 percent of all UNR deputies in 1958 and 40 percent in 1962. Within the party apparatus, as early as 1960 over half of the UNR federation secretaries were "new Gaullists."<sup>51</sup> Indicative of the declining role of Gaullists of 1940-1944 in the UNR was de Gaulle's choice of Georges Pompidou, who was a postwar convert, to be premier and UNR leader. The founding congress of the UD-Ve in November, 1967, heard only a few reminders of Gaullism's glorious past. Its focus clearly was on the future. When the new UD-Ve's Central Committee was charged with selecting a secretary-general, it decided upon Robert Poujade, who was only sixteen years old when de Gaulle first entered liberated Paris.

Among other important characteristics of UNR deputies in the first two parliaments (1959-1967), in comparison with deputies of other parties, are the following: they were less experienced in national politics, younger,

and slightly more often from business and industry. In the fall of 1958, when 67 percent of all respondents in a national poll indicated that they wanted "new men" in parliament,<sup>52</sup> it was natural enough that the legislative elections of November, 1958, should have produced a turnover of parliamentary personnel unprecedented in this century. The National Assembly elected in that year included only 131 holdovers out of 465 deputies from the *métropole*, plus another 48 former deputies or senators. Among the 198 UNR deputies, only 16 were holdovers and another 27 former deputies or senators. As Mattei Dogan has shown, all but 27 of the UNR's "new men" had had some kind of political experience in the Fourth Republic, as parliamentary candidates (49), as party leaders (37), in quasi-political functions such as membership in ministerial cabinets (9), or in local political office (33).<sup>53</sup> Nonetheless, only 43 of the 198 UNR deputies elected in 1958, and 36 of the 229 elected in 1962 had ever sat in the parliament of the Fourth Republic.<sup>54</sup>

With a massive turnover in personnel, the average age of deputies dropped markedly in 1958, as it had after the Liberation. UNR deputies were the youngest of all.<sup>55</sup> The expansion of UNR ranks in the 1962 election brought in more young men, giving the UNR a delegation 53 percent of whom were under fifty years of age, as opposed to 44 percent in all other groups.<sup>56</sup> One-fifth of the UNR deputies were under forty, as opposed to one-fifteenth in all other party groups.<sup>57</sup> With the reelection of many UNR incumbents in 1967, the average age of course increased. Still, however, the average age of UNR deputies (52 years) was below that of opposition Federation deputies (55) and Communist deputies (53).<sup>58</sup> It is most likely that the average age of Gaullist deputies was reduced by the elections of June, 1968, when 142 new deputies were elected under the official Gaullist label.

As indicated in Table 1, the UNR delegation in the National Assembly included slightly fewer workers and farmers than the average in other parties and slightly more businessmen and military officers. The contrast sharpened slightly in 1962, when the representation of the Communist Party (the majority of whose deputies are workers and employees) rose from ten to forty-one seats. Preliminary figures for the Assembly elected in 1967 indicate no striking changes in the occupational backgrounds of UNR deputies, although there was a decline in the proportion of workers and clerks.<sup>59</sup>

The UNR deputies elected in 1962 were similar to the fifty Independent deputies (the traditional Right) in overall percentage of liberal professional men and businessmen, but significantly different in three respects.<sup>60</sup> While the Independents had no workers or employees among them, the UNR was at least represented here by seven percent of its delegation. Secondly,

TABLE I  
PROFESSIONS OF UNR DEPUTIES\*

		I Workers & Employees (Industry, Agriculture & Gov't.)	II Farmers	III Liberal Professions	IV Business and Industry	V Officers, Clergy, and Misc.	Totals
1958	UNR Deputies	11 (6%)	13 (7%)	112 (57%)	54 (27%)	8 (4%)	198
	All non-UNR Deputies	20 (7%)	41 (15%)	152 (57%)	51 (19%)	3 (1%)	<u>267</u> 465
1962	UNR Deputies	16 (7%)	13 (6%)	114 (50%)	71 (31%)	15 (7%)	229
	All non-UNR Deputies	46 (19%)	29 (12%)	120 (51%)	39 (17%)	2 (1%)	<u>236</u> 465

\*Computed from data in Mattei Dogan, "Changement de régime et changement de personnel," in *Le Référendum de septembre et les élections de novembre, 1958* ("Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques," No. 109, Paris, 1960), Table IX, p. 267; and Mattei Dogan, "Note sur le nouveau personnel parlementaire," in *Le Référendum d'octobre et les élections de novembre, 1962* ("Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques," No. 142, Paris, 1965), Table, p. 431.

eighteen percent of the Independents (as opposed to only six percent of the Gaullists) were farmers. Thirdly, the majority of the UNR "businessmen" (41 of 71) were managerial personnel, probably mostly with large corporations, whereas Independent "businessmen" were listed as "merchants" or "industrialists," many of whom undoubtedly were attached to family-owned enterprises. Again in comparison with the UNR group, the MRP delegation included more farmers (28%) and fewer professional men (36%), and the Radicals included more professional men (67%) and fewer businessmen (19%). In the character of the UNR group in the National Assembly, one sees some reflection of the UNR's emphasis on youth and new talent in politics, of its strength in urban areas, and of its interest in young managerial personnel.

If these are the notables of Gaullism, what kinds of voters rally to the Cross of Lorraine? Restricting our attention to the Fifth Republic, a clear distinction must be made between what we shall term the "extended" and the "restricted" Gaullist electorates. The extended electorate is made up of that absolute majority of voters which has responded "yes" to de Gaulle in the great plebiscites of the Fifth Republic, notably the referendum of October, 1962, on the constitutional amendment providing for direct, popular election of the President (when 62 percent of those voting voted "yes"), and which supported him in the first popular presidential election in December, 1965 (when de Gaulle won 55 percent of the votes in the second runoff ballot against François Mitterand). The smaller electorate (17.5%, 36.3%, and 38.2%) is composed of those voters who voted for

Gaullist candidates in the first ballot against a wide field of opponents in the legislative elections of 1958, 1962, and 1967 respectively.<sup>61</sup> Some of the relevant social characteristics of both electorates will be summarized.

Although survey data regarding the legislative elections of November, 1958, suggested that younger voters — especially those in their thirties — tended to be slightly more attracted to the UNR than their elders,<sup>62</sup> later studies clearly indicate that in recent years both the restricted Gaullist electorate and the extended electorate (as shown in Table 2) have in-

TABLE 2  
AGE OF GAULLIST VOTERS

		AGE GROUP			
		21-34	35-49	50-64	65 and over
Referendum, October, 1962*	Yes:	43%	42%	49%	56%
	No:	28%	33%	29%	24%
2nd Ballot,					
Presidential election, December, 1965**	for de Gaulle:	49%	55%	55%	65%
	for Mitterand:	51%	45%	45%	35%

\*From a joint FNSP and IFOP national survey, reported in Guy Michelet, "Attitudes et comportements politiques à l'automne 1962," *Elections 1962*, p. 207. Totals of "blanc, nul," "n'a pas voté," and "sans réponse" ranged from 29 percent for the youngest to 20 percent for the oldest category.

\*\*From a national IFOP poll regarding vote intentions, conducted December 14-16, 1965, on the eve of the second ballot of December 17, 1965. Reported in *Sondages*, No. 4 (1965), special issue entitled, "L'Election présidentielle de décembre 1965," p. 36.

cluded a disproportionate number of older people. The restricted electorate, however, is more balanced than the extended electorate, perhaps because some older voters are willing to vote for de Gaulle personally, but are reluctant to break a longstanding identification with a non-Gaullist party. According to a national survey of voting intentions in the first ballot of the November, 1962, elections, the UNR got almost its full share of votes from voters 21-34 years of age (28% to 31% in the total sample), and only slightly more than its share of voters age 65 and over (20% to 15%).<sup>63</sup>

A more striking characteristic of the Gaullist electorate is its large proportion of women. In the legislative elections of 1958 and 1962, the UNR apparently drew two percent more votes from women than from men, despite the fact that abstention from voting was almost twice as frequent among women as among men.<sup>64</sup> De Gaulle's 62 percent victory over the *cartel des nons* in the referendum of October, 1962, was due in large measure to feminine support, since national survey data indicate that women voted "yes" in a proportion of 50 percent to 20 percent (with the remainder staying at home, or being unwilling to divulge their vote), while among men de Gaulle won only some 42 percent "yes" votes to 38 percent "no" votes.<sup>65</sup> Again in the presidential election of 1965, 61 percent of those

women who had made up their minds — as opposed to 49 percent of male respondents — declared they intended to vote for de Gaulle on the eve of the runoff ballot.<sup>66</sup> As in the case of age differentials, the extended electorate appears to be slightly less balanced than the restricted electorate. It may well be that a direct two-option confrontation — especially between de Gaulle and the Left — tends to make temporary Gaullists of those many women who identify with the MRP (France's most openly Catholic party) or with the Independents, or with no party at all.<sup>67</sup>

With regard to religion, an IFOP survey conducted after the presidential election of December, 1965, discovered that among those respondents who identified themselves as "regular practicing Catholics," 66 percent had preferred de Gaulle (as opposed to 8 percent for Mitterand), while among those who declared themselves "without religion," only 18 percent favored de Gaulle (as opposed to 72 percent for Mitterand). Nonetheless, de Gaulle won the support of 37 percent of self-declared "nonpracticing Catholics," and apparently retained his hold over many Protestant voters in Alsace,<sup>68</sup> demonstrating that Gaullism was not simply a neoclerical movement. Though relevant evidence is limited, it appears that the restricted electorate is only slightly less Catholic, despite its larger share of urban, male, and younger voters. In a national survey conducted three months before the March, 1967, elections, 70 percent of those respondents who intended to vote Gaullist on the first ballot were Catholics who practiced either regularly or from time to time. In contrast, 53 percent of those who intended to vote for the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left were either nonpracticing Catholics or nonbelievers.<sup>69</sup>

With respect to profession, the joint FNSP-IFOP election studies indicate that the distribution within the restricted Gaullist electorate is very much like that among French voters generally. In the first ballot of the 1958 legislative elections, the UNR had its full share of workers (30%), civil servants and employees (20%), artisans and merchants (17%), liberal professional men (7%), and *rentiers* (19%), and lagged behind the normal distribution (6% as opposed to 10%) only with regard to farmers and farm laborers.<sup>70</sup> (*Rentiers* are defined as persons who live off income from property, stocks, or other investments. The number of persons so classified here indicates that numerous retired persons were classified in this way.) With occupations categorized slightly differently in the FNSP-IFOP survey of voting on the first ballot of the 1962 legislative elections, the UNR again appears remarkably close to the national distribution among occupations. Only workers are significantly underrepresented (15 percent, as opposed to 20 percent so classified in the whole sample), and only retired persons are significantly overrepresented (17 percent as opposed to 12 percent).<sup>71</sup> A national survey taken three months before the 1967 elections revealed

that 31 percent of the 515 workers polled intended to vote Gaullist on the first ballot, as opposed to only 30 percent of that intention in the entire sample of 1,780 persons.<sup>72</sup>

Interestingly enough, the extended electorate diverges rather more seriously from the national distribution of professions than does the restricted electorate. A clear majority of workers apparently voted "no" in the October, 1962, referendum, while de Gaulle's plea for "the warm confidence of the Nation" was answered affirmatively by at least two-to-one majorities among merchants, housewives, and retired persons.<sup>73</sup> In the second ballot of the 1965 presidential election, an IFOP poll found that among those respondents who expressed an opinion, de Gaulle had the support of 67 percent of merchants and industrialists, 63 percent of liberal professional men and high-level management personnel, 60 percent of retired persons, 59 percent of farmers, and 55 percent of medium-level employees, but only 45 percent of workers.<sup>74</sup>

The extended electorate tends to absorb much of the traditional Right, as parties of the Left join to challenge de Gaulle. The *restricted* electorate is "rather representative of French diversity," however, both in its socio-economic composition and — to a lesser extent — in the political origins of its voters. Among the 114 UNR voters in the 796 person FNSP-IFOP sample of 1958, 2 admitted to having voted Communist in 1956, 7 had voted Socialist, 7 for Radicals, 15 for the MRP, 14 for Independents, 2 for Poujadists, 13 for Social Republicans (the Gaullist rump party), and 12 had abstained.<sup>75</sup> Of another 42 who declined to report their 1956 vote, some very likely voted for parties of the Left and were now — as Gaullists — reluctant to admit that fact.<sup>76</sup> Leaving this latter category aside, if one considers the MRP to be a party of the Center (a designation some would contest), Gaullist acquisitions in 1958 appear to have come as much from the Left (Communist, Socialist, and — Left only in a traditional sense — Radical) as from the Right (Independent and Poujadist). Even in the legislative elections of November, 1962, when the Independents dropped from 20.1 percent of the vote in 1958 to 13.4 percent, the influx of UNR voters included many from the Left. The 1962 FNSP-IFOP survey found 400 UNR first ballot voters in a sample of 1,534. Of these 400, 4 had voted Communist in 1958, 23 Socialist, 10 Radical, 51 MRP, 174 UNR, 50 Independent, 9 for splinter parties, 30 had abstained, and 49 declined to state.<sup>77</sup>

Even the extended Gaullist electorate is more catholic than its foes on the Left imply. In the October, 1962, referendum — despite the strong urging of their party — 7 percent of those voters who a month later voted Communist chose to acclaim de Gaulle with a "yes" vote. So also did 27 percent of those who voted Socialist, 41 percent of those who voted Radical,



66 percent of the MRP voters, and 52 percent of the Independents.<sup>78</sup> Similarly, on the eve of the second ballot of the December, 1965, presidential election, de Gaulle apparently had the support of some 14 percent of the Communist, Socialist, and Radical voters combined, and some 71 percent of MRP and Independent voters (despite Jean Lecanuet's advice to his supporters to vote for Mitterand).<sup>79</sup> On the basis of survey data and election returns, François Goguel estimates that three million voters who had voted regularly for Communists, Socialists, or Radicals under the Fourth Republic voted for de Gaulle in the first ballot of the December, 1965, elections.<sup>80</sup> Clearly the center of balance of the extended electorate is right of center; yet Gaullism retains some appeal for discontented voters on the Left.

In an old and relatively slow-changing country like France, where much is to be learned by studying traditional regional voting patterns, one needs only to view a map of recent voting results to note that Gaullism's uniqueness lies in its alliance between those bastions of rural traditionalism of the East (Alsace-Lorraine) and the West (Normandy, Brittany, and the Vendée) on the one hand, and the economically dynamic regions of Northern France, where the tradition tends to be Leftist, on the other.<sup>81</sup> Apart from scattered strongholds, the Massif Central and the South offer strong resistance to the Gaullist wave, perhaps, as François Goguel has suggested, not simply because the South is economically backward (it is not consistently so), but also because it is the bearer of an older, more fiercely individualistic, more ideological, and consistently Leftist political culture.<sup>82</sup> Nonetheless, the UNR and the UDR have done considerably better in the Midi than did the RPF in 1951. On the first ballot of the legislative elections of June, 1968, Gaullist candidates won at least thirty percent of the vote in all but three of France's ninety-five departments. The combination of rural support in the West with urban support in the North gives the Gaullist electorate very close to a normal distribution between urban and rural voters, with the extended electorate slightly more rural than the restricted electorate.<sup>83</sup>

The Gaullist electorate, it appears, includes a broad cross-section of the French population. It differs from that cross-section — and usually only moderately — in that it contains a larger than average proportion of older people, women, devout Catholics, retired people, businessmen, former MRP and Independent voters, and people from the West, East, and North. In all respects considered, we have found the extended Gaullist electorate to be more distinctive — and probably more conservative — than the restricted electorate.<sup>84</sup> When de Gaulle himself does battle with the parties, his strongest opposition now is from the Left, thus drawing conservatives into the Gaullist camp in order to prevent a revival of the dreaded Popular

Front. The legislative elections of 1958, 1962, and 1967 — and more clearly yet, the municipal elections of March, 1965, when the UNR succeeded in electing less than a tenth of all municipal councillors — <sup>85</sup> clearly demonstrate that many who will vote for de Gaulle fail to transfer their loyalty to the party which claims him, but which is not always claimed in return.

The dramatic rise of the UNR was facilitated by the comparative weakness of party identification in France in the late 1950's. As a dynamic new party, holding aloft the Cross of Lorraine, it attracted a large number of voters whose interest in politics and whose political loyalties were shallow.<sup>86</sup> The proportion of respondents in IFOP surveys who identified with the UNR fluctuated from 11 percent in June, 1962, to 27 percent in December, 1962 (at the time of the legislative elections), to 14 percent in June, 1963.<sup>87</sup> A study conducted by the Société Française d'Enquêtes par Sondage (SOFRES) in early 1966, however, revealed that the UNR was regarded with "*beaucoup de sympathie*" or "*assez de sympathie*" by 6 percent of those who considered themselves to be of the extreme left, 22 percent of the moderate left, 66 percent of the center, 77 percent of the moderate right, 78 percent of the extreme right, and 40 percent of the apolitical *marais*.<sup>88</sup> This level of support was far greater and broader than that of any other party, although the intensity of the Communist Party's strength among voters of the extreme left (47 percent of whom declared "*beaucoup de sympathie*" for it) was greater than the UNR enjoyed in any category. Along with its first-ballot votes of 38 percent and 43 percent respectively in the legislative elections of 1967 and 1968 (in this latter year not counting another 4 percent for Independent Republicans running without official Gaullist support), this evidence suggests that the Gaullist party gradually may be establishing those voter loyalties which alone can protect it against another electoral flash flood.

On the basis of early reports of IFOP's preelection survey, it appears that the swelled Gaullist electorate of June, 1968, was very similar in social characteristics to de Gaulle's extended electorate. In comparison with the March, 1967, elections, the Gaullist parties in 1968 apparently drew a higher proportion of votes from women, from older persons, and from businessmen. They made limited gains among white collar workers and farmers and none at all among workers.<sup>89</sup> In that crisis election, with the Gaullists exploiting to the full popular fears of communism and chaos, for the first time the extended electorate swung behind Gaullist candidates on the first ballot. Yet undoubtedly many of those voters who joined the Gaullist landslide of June, 1968, have only an ephemeral, *faute de mieux* kind of loyalty to the Gaullist movement.

IV. *Factionalism and Party Building*

Any French political party which hopes to win and to retain a parliamentary majority must learn to survive that traditional Gallic malady: factionalism. This disease played a major role in the demise of the RPF. It continues to threaten the survival of the UDR.

With its initial purpose the avoidance of competition between Gaullists in the legislative elections of November, 1958, the UNR was formed on October 1, 1958, as a federation of various Gaullist organizations, notably the RPF remnant, now called the *Centre National des Républicains Sociaux* (led by Roger Frey and Jacques Chaban-Delmas), the *Union pour le Renouveau Français* (led by Jacques Soustelle), and the *Convention Républicaine* (led by Léon Delbecque).<sup>90</sup> Roger Frey, Secretary-General of the *Républicains Sociaux*, was named to that same post in the UNR. Hardly had the new party come into being than its unity was severely tested over the question of electoral alliances. Soustelle, who had played a key role in turning the May 13, 1958, uprising in Algiers toward de Gaulle, now hoped to wed the UNR to a grand alliance for the defense of French Algeria, in partnership with André Morice, leader of the *Centre Républicain*, Roget Duchet, Secretary-General of the *Centre National des Indépendants* (CNI), and Georges Bidault, leader of the dissident *Démocratie Chrétienne* group. Secretary-General Roger Frey and several UNR Central Committee members, including Edmond Michelet, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, and Michel Debré, opposed such an alliance, largely on the grounds that it inevitably would saddle the UNR with a Right-wing image. The moderates forced a compromise, quite possibly with the help of de Gaulle, who sent Olivier Guichard as his emissary to the Central Committee. The motion adopted by the Central Committee stated that in order to avoid "the multiplication of national and republican candidates and votes," the Secretary-General was being asked to "enter into contract with national political organizations, including the *Centre National des Indépendants*, the *Démocratie Chrétienne*, the *Centre Républicain*, and the Radical-Socialist Party."<sup>91</sup> Frey was empowered to conclude nonaggression agreements — without mutual commitment to French Algeria — with the Radical Socialists and others, as well as with the parties of the Right.

This division within the UNR over Algerian policy — essentially over whether the UNR should allow de Gaulle a free hand, or whether it should press for integration of Algeria with France — continued to plague the party for the next three years. When Roger Frey became Minister of Information in early 1959, and was replaced by Albin Chalandon as UNR Secretary-General, the French Algeria faction, led by Léon Delbecque, turned on the new party chief as an obstacle to their policy goals. "Il faut

déchalandonner l'U.N.R.," wrote one of Delbecque's sympathizers, Raymond Dronne.<sup>92</sup> The schism within the party deepened sharply following de Gaulle's historic speech of September 16, 1959, in which he offered the Algerian population an ultimate choice among three alternatives: "Francification," association, or secession. Jacques Soustelle, about to leave for a tour of French possessions in the Pacific, shot off a letter to the UNR Central Committee asking the party to declare immediately in favor of *la francisation*. The Central Committee, meeting on September 18, voted simply to give full support to de Gaulle.<sup>93</sup> The next day four UNR deputies — Arrighi, Biaggi, Battesti, and Thomazo — joined a newly created "Rally for French Algeria," despite a prior pledge taken by all UNR deputies not to join any other political organization during their term of office.<sup>94</sup> The following month, October, 1959, with an Algerian policy debate coming up in the National Assembly, the UNR parliamentary group in that chamber decided against commitment to any one of the three options. Nine UNR deputies promptly resigned from the party in protest.<sup>95</sup> When four of these deputies returned hat in hand requesting readmission (there being little hope for political salvation outside the Gaullist church), they were met with a closed door and a promise of reexamination of their cases at the end of one year.

The first UNR National Congress, meeting in Bordeaux in November, 1959, naturally became a battleground between the two major factions within the party, led for the moment by Jacques Soustelle (even though he was then a member of the government) and by Albin Chalandon. Soustelle was warmly acclaimed by the Congress. He had the enthusiastic support of the party organizations in Algeria and in the departments of Rhône, Bouches du Rhône, and Meurthe-et-Moselle.<sup>96</sup> The Chalandon wing prevailed, however, with French Algeria militants largely being kept off the party Central Committee. The final resolution, prepared in closed committee for the Congress' approval, simply declared "its total confidence in the person and the actions of General de Gaulle" and in his Algerian policy, while reaffirming its desire to prevent "any form of secession" and to preserve "a tight union between the *Métropole* and Algeria."<sup>97</sup>

The rift within the party could not be patched over. The Week of the Barricades uprising in Algiers in January, 1960, found two UNR deputies in open support of the rebels.<sup>98</sup> Then on February 5, 1960, Jacques Soustelle was dismissed from his position as Minister for the Sahara. When Soustelle continued to criticize de Gaulle's Algerian policy in public, he was expelled from the party in April, 1960. Four more deputies quit the UNR in sympathy with Soustelle, two of them from Soustelle's department of the Rhône.<sup>99</sup> The UNR federation of the Rhône cut all relations with the UNR headquarters in Paris; the federation of the Nord declared it-

self autonomous; and throughout the party membership Soustelle's many admirers were restless and discontent.<sup>100</sup> The failure of UNR deputies to vote a motion on Algerian policy at the end of their study conference of September, 1960, indicated that party unanimity was still beyond reach on this question.<sup>101</sup> Several more deputies resigned or were expelled over Algerian policy before the party's time of trouble ended.<sup>102</sup>

Gradually de Gaulle solved the problem for the UNR. His mastery over the Algiers putsch of April, 1961, his overwhelming success in the two popular referenda on Algerian policy in January, 1961, and April, 1962, and — above all — his continuing hold over the electorate in the constitutional referendum of October, 1962, and in the legislative elections of November, 1962 (when all former UNR deputies who had left the fold were crushingly defeated), helped the party to restore its unity around the General. Soustelle clearly had been correct in the spring of 1960 when he objected that he could not have violated the UNR's Algerian policy since the party had taken no substantive policy stand. Throughout the war years, the UNR leadership remained fully aware that the party's own price of union was blind obedience to de Gaulle on Algeria.

Once the French Algeria wing of the UNR had fled or been purged by the end of 1961, the most permanent cleavage within the party came to center on social and economic policy. Already in 1958 and 1959 UNR Secretary-General Albin Chalandon had pleaded — unsuccessfully — against the government's deflationary fiscal and economic policy.<sup>103</sup> By 1961, as resentment grew within the party over the government's tight credit policies, its restraints on wage increases (especially in the public sector), and its meager efforts in the social welfare field, first the UNR National Congress, then the Central Committee, and finally the party's Professional and Labor Action Association all urged the government to ease the economic plight of workers and civil servants. Perhaps the bitterest criticism from within the party came from the pen of the director of the party daily, *La Nation*. In a special issue of April 29, 1961, Joël Le Tac wrote a stinging editorial against "ce régime à la Guizot." "And to serve General de Gaulle," wrote Le Tac, "the man who after Liberation had accomplished a veritable social revolution, one saw thrown up a regime of bookkeepers, imperturbably aligning statistics in response to the demands of the workers."<sup>104</sup> Le Tac subsequently was forced to resign as Departmental Secretary of the UNR Union of the Seine, even though Albin Chalandon came to his support.

The potential for conflict within the Gaullist camp over economic policy was increased measurably as a result of the legislative elections of November, 1962. Following a clash with the National Assembly in October, 1962, de Gaulle determined to seek a reliable parliamentary majority in the en-



suing elections. André Malraux, de Gaulle's representative for the occasion, offered the Gaullist name and, in most cases, exclusive Gaullist candidacy, not only to the UNR candidates but also to Gaullists of the Left and to certain Independents and Popular Republicans who consented to accept the label — and the ensuing Gaullist discipline — of the Association of the Fifth Republic. Following a Gaullist electoral victory, the Democratic Union of Labor (UDT), the Gaullists of the Left, quickly fused with the UNR in what now, in December, 1962, officially became the UNR-UDT.

The UNR-UDT fusion brought into the government party such long-standing Gaullists as René Capitant, Louis Vallon, and Jean de Lipkowski, creators of the first Gaullist party, the *Union Gaulliste*, in 1946. Without organizational unity or substantial cooperation from the UNR, Gaullists of the Left had drawn less than one percent of the vote in 1958 and had failed to elect a single deputy. They fused with the UDT in April, 1959, recruited a membership of some two thousand (largely in Paris), published a bi-weekly, *Notre République*, and kept alive an economic and social critique from within the greater Gaullist family.<sup>105</sup> Their decision to fuse with the UNR was based partially on the hope that they could be more influential from within, and partially on de Gaulle's determination that "the Left must be present in Gaullism and Gaullism in the Left."<sup>106</sup> De Gaulle is said to have encouraged and even arbitrated efforts toward fusion.

With the help of the Fifth Republic label, the UDT elected fourteen deputies in November, 1962, then, merging with the UNR, ceased to exist as an organization. In return, its leaders were relatively well treated. Louis Vallon became *Rapporteur Général* of the Finance Committee in the National Assembly; René Capitant was named President of the National Assembly's Committee on Laws; and two UDT leaders were appointed ministers, Jean Sainteny as Minister of Veterans, and Gilbert Grandval (a holdover) as Minister of Labor.<sup>107</sup> Within the party organization, UDT leaders such as Léo Hamon, Jean-Claude Servan-Schreiber, René Caille, Pierre Billotte, and Gilbert Grandval have been active and influential in a variety of positions. The UDT biweekly, *Notre République*, now became an official UNR-UDT organ, although its editors remained unchanged and it continued to press vigorously for social and economic reforms. The UDT element lost some of its force within the UNR after the March, 1967, elections, in which Vallon was defeated. The Left Gaullist contingent survived, however, strengthened by the association with the reorganized Gaullist parliamentary group of such reform-minded ministers as Edgar Faure, Minister of Agriculture, Edgard Pisani, Minister of Equipment, and Louis Joxe, Minister of Justice.<sup>108</sup>

Until 1967, Gaullists of the Left had rather limited impact on Gaullist economic policy. In January, 1966, Giscard d'Estaing finally gave way to



Michel Debré as Finance Minister after de Gaulle's disappointingly narrow victory in the presidential elections of December, 1965; yet Debré must have seemed a very modest improvement to Louis Vallon and René Capitant.<sup>109</sup> Minor reforms were enacted in 1965 concerning corporation law and labor-management "enterprise committees," but the UDT's hopes for reconstruction of capitalism through the "association of capital and labor" (an old Gaullist theme) met resistance and delay at the hands of Debré and the economically conservative Pompidou government. It was only through de Gaulle's personal intervention, reportedly against the desires of the cabinet and the bureaucracy, that a compulsory profit-sharing plan finally was enacted into law in the summer of 1967.<sup>110</sup>

Often the former UDT leaders have been disappointed, as when the Action Committee nominated only a few Gaullists of the Left alongside numerous conservatives for the 1967 legislative elections; occasionally they have threatened a split in order to speed up social and economic reform.<sup>111</sup> When the March, 1967, elections produced a reduced and more conservative Gaullist majority in the National Assembly, René Capitant first charged in a *Notre République* editorial that "... in effect the government has conducted a rightist policy in the economic and social fields . . .," and then chose for himself an "attached" (*apparenté*) rather than a membership status in the Gaullist parliamentary group.<sup>112</sup> When Pompidou and the party leadership called a congress at Lille in November, 1967, for the purpose of reorganizing and expanding the party, Capitant and Vallon trumpeted in a *Notre République* headline, "We will not go to Lille."<sup>113</sup> *Notre République's* formal objection was to Pompidou's attempt "to incarcerate the regime in a party." One would suspect that a more Leftist-looking party would have appeared less dangerous to Vallon and Capitant.

Although a few small Left Gaullist groups joined the *Notre République* boycott, notably the Front Travailleiste (led by Lucien Junillon) and the Front du Progrès (led by Jacques Dauer), others of similar persuasion attended the Lille congress, among them Pierre Billotte, Léo Hamon, Philippe Dechartre (Secretary-General of the Union de la Gauche V<sup>e</sup> République) and Robert Grossmann (President of the Union des Jeunes pour le Progrès). The new UD-V<sup>e</sup> took a strong step toward reconciliation with the dissident Left Gaullists when it selected as the party's first Secretary-General Robert Poujade, a choice applauded by both *Notre République* and the Front du Progrès.<sup>114</sup> This latter group was eventually lured into formal affiliation with the UD-V<sup>e</sup> in the spring of 1968.

The partisan loyalties of Left Gaullists were tried almost to the breaking point during the massive strikes and demonstrations which shook de Gaulle's Republic in May and June, 1968. René Capitant had long predicted that the conservative economic policies of the Pompidou government would in-

crease working class grievances. When the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left posed a motion of censure in the midst of the general strike, Capitant resigned his seat in parliament rather than support the Pompidou government. Again, as on lesser issues in the past, de Gaulle gave support to Capitant's demands for social and economic reform. On May 31, 1968, Capitant became Minister of Justice in a reformulated government which also included such Left Gaullist leaders as Yvon Morandart (President of the Front Travailleiste), Philippe Dechartre (President of the Union de la Gauche V<sup>e</sup> République), and Albin Chalandon (a longstanding spokesman for reformists among Gaullist party regulars). All but Morandart, who was defeated in his constituency, were kept on after the June, 1968, elections. They were joined in the new cabinet by Jean de Lipkowski and Jacques Trorial, both members of the Union de la Gauche V<sup>e</sup> République. Violent pressure from students, workers, and the formal Left opposition parties apparently reaffirmed de Gaulle's conviction that "the Left must be present in Gaullism and Gaullism in the Left." De Gaulle's proposed solution to the social crisis of May, 1968 — greater mass "participation" in the administration of economic and governmental affairs — was reminiscent of a score of *Notre République* editorials.

Recalling both their premerger weakness and de Gaulle's desire that they remain in the fold, Left Gaullists usually feel that, at least for the time being, they are more influential within the UDR, where they have found numerous kindred spirits, than outside.<sup>115</sup> Those Left Gaullists who remain outside the UDR, notably the members of the Front Travailleiste, have little hope for power and influence save insofar as de Gaulle and the UDR choose to call upon them.

There is indeed still a Left wing within the UDR, a wing which despised the fiscal policies of Giscard d'Estaing, and which looks upon Michel Debré and Georges Pompidou with some suspicion. Though *Notre République* speaks most consistently for that wing, it is not infrequently joined by UDR leaders of the stripe of the editor, Jacques de Montalais, of the UDR daily.<sup>116</sup>

One must not exaggerate the strength and unity of the Left wing, however. A study of roll-call votes in the hectic last half of the spring, 1965, session of the National Assembly revealed no solid opposition group within the UNR delegation. From April 27, 1965, to June 26, 1965, as the government pushed through the Assembly important bills on national military service, tax reform, reform of corporation law, and revision of the *comités d'entreprise*, the dissenters and abstainers within the UNR group tended to vary from question to question. In a total of thirty-eight roll-call votes, six UNR deputies — Lecornu, Meunier, Schwartz, Taittinger, Vallon, and Ziller — dissented or abstained from the majority UNR position on four

or more occasions. Another fifteen UNR deputies (out of a total of 215 full members) dissented or abstained three times.<sup>117</sup> Apart from a meat marketing bill, on which thirty-two UNR deputies voted against the majority position and three more abstained (many apparently in defense of local interests),<sup>118</sup> the largest number of dissenters came on a bill requiring corporations to inform stockholders of directors' salaries (eighteen against and three abstaining), one allowing certain stockholders a plural vote in specified circumstances (twenty-three against and one abstaining), and another — again on the question of the stockholders' right to information — requiring corporation executives to provide detailed accounts of salaries and expenses (twenty-one for and four abstaining, with most UNR deputies now opposed).<sup>119</sup> Although one might have expected the first of these roll calls (threatening corporation secrecy) to bring out a "Right wing" opposition, and the last two to reveal a "Left wing" opposition on economic policy, in fact, the "Right wingers" were mostly obedient on other votes, and, of the supposed "Left wingers," only Louis Vallon, René Capitant, and François Le Douarec show up as dissenters or abstainers on both of the last-mentioned roll calls. Though there may have been a more or less cohesive Left wing at work behind the scenes, when the final votes were called, UNR deputies tended to close ranks. Those who did dissent or abstain from the group position varied greatly from question to question.<sup>120</sup>

Unlike the UDT, those thirty-five Independents who were elected under the Gaullist label in 1962 established a separate parliamentary group, the Independent Republicans, which remained outside the UNR. While rather faithfully delivering their votes to give the government an absolute majority after the 1962 election, the Independent Republicans distinguished themselves from many of their UNR partners by their attachment to European political integration, to economic liberalism, and to a revival of parliamentary powers.<sup>121</sup> Again in contrast to the UDT, until 1967, when they elected several young men, almost all Independent Republican deputies were experienced politicians who had built local political bases and who had been elected to the National Assembly in 1958 or earlier without the Gaullist label.<sup>122</sup> Far from seeking admission to the UNR, the Independent Republican leader (and former Finance Minister) Valéry Giscard d'Estaing insists that his is a "reflective," not an unconditional Gaullism;<sup>123</sup> he and his colleagues declare themselves "loyal but not servile partners of the UNR."<sup>124</sup> Their announced goal is "to become the majority of the majority."<sup>125</sup> In pursuit of high ambitions for himself and the *Giscardiens*, during the year following his replacement as Finance Minister in January, 1966, Giscard d'Estaing made extensive political tours of France, established a national "Federation of Independent Republicans," created a series of clubs entitled

"Perspectives et Réalités" (in accordance with current French political fashions), and fought hard, though unsuccessfully, for the right to run Independent Republicans against other Gaullist candidates on the first ballot of the legislative elections of March, 1967.<sup>126</sup> Bolstered by an impressive victory in those elections, which raised their Assembly strength from thirty to forty-four seats at a time when the Gaullist majority as a whole was being reduced from 284 to 244 seats, the Independent Republicans fended off all post-election pressures for a merger with the UNR. By the summer of 1967, Giscard d'Estaing was publicly criticizing the government over foreign policy, deficit spending, and policy making without "the necessary consultation."<sup>127</sup>

The crisis of May and June, 1968, shook the loyalty of Gaullism's Right wing just as it temporarily alienated portions of the Left wing. In the midst of the crisis, on May 30, 1968, Giscard called for the formation of a new government, that is to say one without Pompidou. In the legislative elections of June, 1968, the Independent Republicans ran a separate slate of candidates on the first ballot, challenging official Gaullist candidates in fifty-two districts. They expanded their share of Assembly seats from forty-four to sixty-one in those elections; yet the UDR (campaigning under the *nom de guerre* of the Union for the Defense of the Republic) emerged with 292 out of 487 seats — a strong majority even without the votes of Independent Republican deputies. In early summer of 1968 there were no signs that Giscard was prepared to abandon the fight for the succession. One day his followers would be needed again.

Apart from the *Giscardiens*, who pose the most serious threat to Gaullist unity, Gaullists of all political stripes gradually are being drawn into a single party. With Premier Georges Pompidou presiding, an Action Committee for the Fifth Republic designated an official Gaullist candidate in each district — not always the Gaullist incumbent — for the legislative elections of March, 1967. These official candidates — a number of them from outside the UNR — proceeded to crush all but one of the several dozen dissident Gaullists who ran against the Committee's designees, leaving Gaullist deputies with one more reminder of the risks of revolt.<sup>128</sup> Following the elections, the UNR parliamentary group renamed itself the "Democratic Union for the Fifth Republic" and absorbed most of those successful Fifth Republic candidates who had been lured away from the Radicals and the Popular Republicans. In November, 1967, the UNR national organization followed suit. At a party congress convened at Lille, unconditional Gaullists of twenty-five years standing shared the platform with such new converts as Edgar Faure and Maurice Schumann. The new Union Démocratique pour la V<sup>e</sup> République, which emerged out of the

Congress, had succeeded in shaking off a few more of the exclusive, sect-like characteristics which long had hampered the expansion of the Gaullist movement. Only the Independent Republicans and a few small Left Gaullist groups remained organizationally outside the fold. During the legislative election campaign of June, 1968, further efforts were made to draw prominent politicians into the Gaullist coalition, the Union for the Defense of the Republic.

Apart from the usual rivalries among party leaders, the most permanent cleavage within the UDR — and more pronouncedly within the extended Gaullist majority — now centers on social and economic policy. So long as de Gaulle remains on the scene to arbitrate and to force agreement, as he had done through his indirect intervention in the Action Committee for the Fifth Republic and through his strong public statement on Gaullist unity on October 28, 1966, there is little danger of schism.<sup>129</sup> As René Capitant has written, the present unity of the UDR “. . . is strongly favored by the presence of General de Gaulle at the head of Gaullism. Still today as in the past, from him come political drive and leadership, and arbitration in the domain of organization, where personalities are involved.”<sup>130</sup> When the supreme arbiter retires, Gaullist unity at last will become dependent upon compromise and adjustment.

#### V. *Organization*

If the UDR is to survive de Gaulle it must not only prevent fragmentation, but must also build an organization with solid local roots. The party's record in this regard is a mixed one.

As is fitting for a party which borrows from both the Left and the Right, the UDR falls neatly neither into the traditional category of “cadre-type party” nor into that of “mass-type party.”<sup>131</sup> As in the cadre party, detailed programmatic commitments are avoided, and decision making within the UDR tends to be the affair of a rather small clique of men. Unlike the cadre party, the UDR is highly centralized and disciplined. In terms of membership, there has been no massive recruitment drive, such as the one which won the RPF a million members in 1948. Yet with a formal membership which grew to over eighty thousand by 1963, at a time when French party memberships generally were low, the UNR became much more of a mass organization than typical French cadre parties like the Radicals and the Independents.<sup>132</sup> Moreover, after an initial fear of flooding the party with French Algeria partisans (as Delbecq and Soustelle desired),<sup>133</sup> UNR leaders used study circles, forums, cadre schools, women's, youth, agricultural, and student clubs, and a variety of other techniques in order to catch a larger proportion of the population in the party's organizational



net. In February, 1967, the recently elected Secretary-General of the UD-V<sup>e</sup> called for a new membership drive, with major emphasis on the South.

At least for the moment the organization character of the UDR is better described, as René Rémond characterizes it, as a "government party."<sup>134</sup> Created to organize popular and parliamentary votes in support of an existing Gaullist government, the UDR has enjoyed adequate sanctions and rewards to enforce discipline, and has staved off factions like that of Soustelle and Delbecq which would commit the party to specific programs and hence perhaps embarrass the government. Like the national organization of the British Conservative Party, the UDR organization is designed not to make policy decisions, but rather to mobilize support for those who do.

The organizational structure of the UD-V<sup>e</sup>, as the party outside parliament is still called for the moment, was determined by the Lille Congress in November, 1967. It builds from the legislative district organization (the base unit) to the Departmental Union, to the National Congress (*Assises*), which meets every two years. At the national level, the pyramid builds from the National Congress to the National Council, with six hundred members, meeting approximately every year, to the Central Committee, with one hundred members, meeting theoretically every month, to the Executive Bureau, which contains some twenty-five members and meets weekly in principle. A portion of the members of each body is elected from below; another portion sits by right of elective or appointive office; and — in the case of the Central Committee and Executive Bureau — a certain number are co-opted.

As Jean Charlot has noted, when party ministers and deputies are numerous, as has been the case in recent years, the nonelected members are able to dominate all national party organs save, conceivably, the National Congress.<sup>135</sup> Although the National Congress has never escaped government control on an important issue, on occasion it has served as a forum for active debate. The Congress at Bordeaux in 1959 was the scene of a major intra-party battle over Algerian policy. The 1961 Congress at Strasbourg was more orderly, yet witnessed vigorous debate over social and economic policy. For the next five years, both the National Congress and, to a lesser extent, the National Council, served primarily to rouse enthusiasm among party workers, to demonstrate party unity, and to spread the UNR message to the general public. In this period, with party leaders preparing the script, these larger party organs tended to suppress conflict, although, to be sure, there was now somewhat less conflict to suppress.

The Lille Congress of 1967 — the founding Congress of the UD-V<sup>e</sup> — displayed renewed signs of independence. After long discussion, the Statutes Committee at that Congress amended the new party name proposed by party leaders — "L'Union des Démocrates Sociaux pour la V<sup>e</sup> République"



— on the grounds that the word “social” was unnecessary and overused.<sup>136</sup> There were also less successful objections to the admission to membership of longstanding critics of Gaullism, as well as to election of the national party Secretary-General by the Central Committee rather than by the National Congress.

In higher party circles, before 1967 there was a tendency for the membership of each body to expand and for decisions to be left in the hands of the next higher, and less unwieldy, authority. Even the supreme party executive organ of the UNR, the Political Commission, rarely took decisions on its own initiative, either of a policy or administrative nature.<sup>137</sup> Though party organs, especially at the higher levels, undoubtedly have had some long range influence on government policy (as in René Capitant's pressure for reforms of the *comités d'entreprise*), Minister of Veterans' Affairs Raymond Triboulet was probably truthful, if unnecessarily blunt, when he told a noisy assembly of delegates at the 1961 UNR National Congress, “You should know that motions voted by a congress have never changed anything whatsoever in the policy of a government.”<sup>138</sup> Policy decisions are ultimately the affair of the government, and organizational decisions the affair of the party secretariat working closely with such key party leaders as Georges Pompidou, Roger Frey, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Michel Debré, and presidential aides such as Olivier Guichard and Jacques Foccart. And in both organizational decisions and especially in policy decisions, de Gaulle is final arbiter.

The UD-V<sup>e</sup> administrative apparatus is now equally centralized. Soon after former RPF Secretary-General Jacques Baumel was chosen by the Central Committee to be the sixth Secretary-General of the UNR in December, 1962, the manner of selecting departmental secretaries was changed from elections from below to appointment by the Secretary-General.<sup>139</sup> In the course of the next thirty months, approximately two-thirds of all departmental secretaries were replaced.<sup>140</sup> With efficiency the goal, many faithful old Gaullists, who tended to look upon the party as a closed and private congregation, were asked to step aside. Although resistance was met in some departmental unions, as in Vaucluse, Pyrénées Orientales, Hérault, and Gard (where the old departmental secretary refused replacement and took his organization — files and all — with him out of the party), in the main Baumel and his secretariat were able to tighten controls over the entire party administration.<sup>141</sup> At his service in the well-equipped UNR headquarters in Paris, Baumel had a staff of approximately fifty, not including secretaries. Though all of these men had another occupation, several were government employees effectively on loan to the party headquarters. A score of party representatives (*chargés en mission*) toured the country, help-

ing to construct and to strengthen local and departmental party organizations.

In 1967 and 1968 the party's top administrative structure was twice reformed. In May, 1967, Baumel stepped down in favor of a collegial five-man national secretariat. Georges Pompidou and Roger Frey became the actual though unofficial party leaders. When the new UD-V<sup>e</sup> statutes restored the single party executive, the Executive Committee chose Robert Poujade, one of the five reigning national secretaries, to be General Secretary. Poujade in turn kept on three of his four colleagues in the national secretariat: Jean Charbonnel as an assistant secretary-general in charge of economic and social questions and of relations with associated organizations; René Tomasini as Secretary for the National Congress and the National Council; and Jean Taittinger as Treasurer.<sup>142</sup> Poujade completed his team with Jean Valleix, in charge of internal party organization, and Michel Herson, whose specialty was to be the preparation of elections.

The task of organization is far from complete, however. As Jacques Baumel admitted after the failure of the UNR assault on the local positions of the older parties in the municipal elections of March, 1965, in many areas "... the UNR-UDT is practically nonexistent at the base."<sup>143</sup> After those elections, with the conviction that time is on the side of the Gaullists, Minister of Interior Roger Frey commented (not altogether accurately) that at the beginning of the Third Republic, "it took the Republicans fifty years" to gain control of the communes of France.<sup>144</sup>

Despite its centralized character, the UDR cannot always be assured of controlling its locally elected officeholders. To be sure, the presence of de Gaulle at the head of the state lends unity to the party, yet, as we have seen, a diversity of views contend on economic and social policies. Were de Gaulle no longer on the scene, those UDR deputies with strong local support would have little need for the party in order to win reelection. For example, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Mayor of Bordeaux and President of the National Assembly, is considerably stronger in the department of Gironde than is his party. Chaban-Delmas retains a secure political base in Bordeaux, even though the UNR's share of the ten-seat Gironde delegation has dropped from seven in 1958 to five in 1962 to three in 1967.<sup>145</sup> At the commune level as well as at the legislative district level, Gaullist electoral success in Gironde has come in large part through focusing on personalities rather than on parties.<sup>146</sup> Elsewhere, in the district of Sarthe, the intelligent and effective deputy-mayor of Sablé, Joël Le Theule (now a government minister), was reelected on the first ballot in November, 1962, in March, 1967, and again in June, 1968, even though in 1965 the UD-V<sup>e</sup> could boast no more than nine dues-paying members in his entire district.<sup>147</sup> So long as single-member districts are retained, and so long as men like Chaban-Del-

mas and Le Theule can maintain the personal confidence of their districts (through attention to local needs in the old Radical style of the Third Republic, quips Le Theule), the central party will have difficulty imposing tight discipline in a post-Gaullist era. And those many UDR deputies who have no strong local base may have difficulty surviving the passing of de Gaulle.

On organizational matters as on questions of economic policy, UD-V<sup>e</sup> leaders frequently are not of one mind. The second UNR Secretary-General, Albin Chalandon, and the sixth, Jacques Baumel, greatly valued such parallel activities as colloquia, study groups, and clubs, whereas the third man in that post, Jacques Richard, gave more attention (with rather meager results) to auxiliary organizations for workers, farmers, merchants, and other occupational groups.<sup>148</sup> While Minister of the Interior, Roger Frey (whose enthusiasm for colloquia and clubs was considerably less than that of Baumel and his staff) proposed that the essential task in party organization was to open the UNR to "those on the Right and on the Left who have not yet joined us," and to transform it into "an organized, structured party, such as conceived by the Anglo-Saxons."<sup>149</sup> Apparently this Frey proposal of March, 1965, was launched without prior consultation with Baumel and his staff.<sup>150</sup> The UNR Deputy General-Secretary for Organization and Implantation, Claude Labbé, questioned the propriety of strict discipline in a party seeking to hold a diverse majority together, and preferred recruitment of the voters of other parties rather than of their politicians.<sup>151</sup> In 1967 the Frey proposal for "opening" of the party was implemented at the Lille Congress, but not before Baumel had been removed as Secretary-General. It may well be that once again the presence of de Gaulle as a potential final arbiter prevented a more serious factional dispute.<sup>152</sup>

One of the key organizational problems for any party which gains a share of power in a parliamentary system concerns relations between the government, the parliamentary party, and the national party structure. In the case of the UDR, the relationship between party and parliamentary group so far has presented no serious problem. So long as such key figures in the government as Frey, Debré, and de Gaulle's representatives keep a strong hand over both party and parliamentary group, there can be no real conflict between them. In theory, the bylaws of the UNR National Council provided that one of that body's duties was "to inform and to supervise the action of the Parliamentary Groups of the National Assembly and of the Senate."<sup>153</sup> In practice, the UNR group in the National Assembly seemed to consider itself to be the party, as the British parliamentary parties tend to do.<sup>154</sup>

More difficult by far than relations between party and deputies have been those between the UNR group, now the UDR group, in the National

Assembly and the government.<sup>155</sup> Parliamentary grievances were sharply voiced over the government's Algerian policy and over its behavior during the miners' strike of 1963. More significant are the repeated pleas from the UDR benches for an end to the government's cavalier treatment of its supporters in the National Assembly. Among the critics have been such prominent UDR deputies as Jacques Chaban-Delmas, President of the National Assembly, René Tomasini, a national UD-V<sup>e</sup> secretary, Achile Peretti, formerly a vice-president of the UNR group in the National Assembly, Joël Le Tac, then Director of *La Nation*, and Raymond Schmittlein, then President of the UNR group in the National Assembly. In 1960, Chaban-Delmas warned that "it is necessary that there be established between the Government and Parliament a relationship which admits the real existence of Parliament." He added that "an Executive without true parliamentary controls leads gradually to arbitrary action and to dictatorship."<sup>156</sup> In sharper tones, he protested in mid-1961 that the government was behaving like "an autocrat, arrogating to itself full powers the better to abuse them, especially by preventing, through its control of the agenda, the discussion of any private member's bill and indeed any subject desired by the representatives of the nation."<sup>157</sup> In a similar vein, at a study conference for UNR deputies held at Pornichet in September, 1961, René Tomasini regretted the absence of a true dialogue between government and parliament. In three years, he noted, only 21 out of 496 bills proposed by deputies had been placed by the government on the Assembly's agenda, while 206 out of 273 government bills had been adopted.<sup>158</sup> When Tomasini's colleagues joined in, asking for more government attention to parliament, Prime Minister Michel Debré retorted angrily that his critics were men of "frustrated ambitions," and that he refused to be "a President of the Council of the Fourth Republic."<sup>159</sup> Raymond Schmittlein, President of the UNR group in the Assembly, seemed to be joining the critics when later in the same meeting he argued that though the UNR must generally support the Government, ". . . the turtle-shelled technocrats must cease to dominate the regime. Civil servants have too much importance, and if *l'intendance ne suit pas*, it is because political necessities are not being taken enough into account."<sup>160</sup> Perhaps the most violent Gaullist critique of the government came from the pen of Joël Le Tac in the special *La Nation* editorial mentioned above. Wrote Le Tac, "Its [the UNR's] role should not be limited to filling the stage, to amusing the gallery, between two television appearances of General de Gaulle."<sup>161</sup>

Particularly in the first Assembly, from 1959 to 1962, morale among the UNR deputies frequently was low. Absenteeism was a continual problem, as deputies frequently felt that attendance made little difference.<sup>162</sup> Even Gaullist deputies were not unaffected by a proud and long-standing French

parliamentary tradition which militated against placid acceptance of government policy making, British style. Part of the problem was solved by the ending of the Algerian War and by the replacement of the brusque Debré with the more tactful Pompidou, who promised that the UNR group had an important role to play in helping to formulate legislation.<sup>163</sup> In the second Assembly, from 1962 to 1967, the government gave more attention to majority deputies, especially when they presented their amendments behind the scenes, as in parliamentary committees or party subject groups, or through the parliamentary party's "*bureau politique*."<sup>164</sup>

If the still heterogeneous UNR group was more unified in the second Assembly than in the first, the credit is due partially to Henry Rey, deputy from the Loire-Atlantique and president of the group since May, 1963, with the exception of a few weeks in June and July of 1968, when he served as a Minister of State.<sup>165</sup> Unlike some of his predecessors, Rey did not display his personal ambitions in such a way as to arouse the jealousy and suspicion of his peers. Though seemingly an *inconditionnel* to the outside world, he was flexible and allowed free discussion in the forty-man *bureau* of the group, where most group decisions are effectively made.<sup>166</sup> His talent for reaching agreement, plus the government's frequent willingness to accept carefully formulated amendments, had restored some decorum to the UNR group by the end of the second Assembly.

At the beginning of the third Assembly, the government's decision in April, 1967, to demand a wide range of delegated legislative powers clearly revived resentment among Gaullist deputies over the meagerness of the powers left to them. Edgard Pisani resigned from the cabinet in protest against the delegated powers decision.<sup>167</sup> The Independent Republican group accepted that decision only under great and prolonged protest. Albin Chalandon most likely is correct in suggesting that on this point, as on many others, Giscard was only "saying out loud what others [UD-V<sup>e</sup> deputies] are whispering."<sup>168</sup> By the end of June, 1967, Pompidou was complaining of the "intolerable" and "inadmissible" attitude of some majority deputies.<sup>169</sup>

Another source of antagonism between the Gaullist parliamentary group and the government was de Gaulle's long-standing preference for a non-partisan cabinet. To the frequent annoyance of UDR deputies, de Gaulle has been most reluctant to allow the major government party to be a governing party. Throughout the life of the first Assembly the UNR never held a majority of the posts in the government. In the second Assembly, from 1962 to 1967, they enjoyed only a narrow majority of ministries, with such key posts as foreign affairs and (until January, 1966) finance in the hands of civil servants, Independents, and a declining representation from other parties.<sup>170</sup> When Michel Debré was set aside as Prime Minister in April, 1962, de Gaulle chose as his successor, and presumably majority party



leader, a banker, Georges Pompidou, who was not even a UNR member. Pompidou increasingly played the role of party leader, and after 1964 or 1965 was generally so recognized. At the height of his prestige within the party, following the sweeping Gaullist victory in the legislative elections of June, 1968, Pompidou was summarily dismissed by President de Gaulle to make way for Maurice Couve de Murville, a dedicated diplomat and civil servant who, like most other ministers, had given scant attention to party affairs.

In the legislative elections of March, 1967, and June, 1968, ministers at last were required to present themselves as Gaullist candidates for parliament. Twenty-six of the twenty-eight ministers ran under the Fifth Republic label in 1967. In the government formed in April, 1967, twenty-one of the twenty-nine members joined the new Gaullist parliamentary group, the Democratic Union for the Fifth Republic, until they were required by the incompatibility rule of the constitution to resign their Assembly seats at the end of thirty days in favor of their replacements. One more minister (Maurice Schumann) "attached" himself to the Democratic Union, and an additional three members of the government joined the Independent Republican group. Although two defeated candidates were kept on in the cabinet (Maurice Couve de Murville as Foreign Minister and Pierre Messmer as Defense Minister), de Gaulle at last had taken an important step in the direction of party government.<sup>171</sup> Again in the June, 1968, elections, all members of the government save André Malraux were candidates for the National Assembly. In the postelection government headed by Couve de Murville, all except Malraux had run successfully on the UDR ticket, including three Independent Republicans.

## VI. *Conclusion*

In certain respects the UDR is, as it claims to be, a new type of French political party. In its blending of stability and progress, it borrows from both the Left and the Right. With the UDR as its central force, the Gaullist parliamentary majority has introduced into French politics the notion of the government party, whose primary purpose is to produce the electoral and parliamentary support necessary to allow the government to survive and to act. With regard to its electorate, Gaullism's voting strength in many of the economically most dynamic and prosperous areas of France is indication of its appeal to modernizers. In its commitment to a pragmatic striving toward economic growth and progress, it shares in that ideology which masquerades as the end of ideology.<sup>172</sup> Though de Gaulle rejects the vision of European political unification, in many ways he and his followers belong to the new, not the old, Europe.

In four significant respects the UDR resembles those pragmatic, ma-

majority-seeking, "catch-all parties" (to borrow Otto Kirchheimer's phrase) which now dominate the political scene in Germany as well as in Great Britain and the United States.<sup>173</sup> First, like them it eschews sectarianism and actively seeks ever wider popular majorities. It draws support from a wide spectrum, excluding no important segment of French society. Although the extended Gaullist electorate is less representative of the entire population than the restricted electorate, in comparative terms the 45 percent of French workers who voted for de Gaulle on December 19, 1965, is at least 10 percent more than either the Conservative Party or the Christian Democratic Union usually wins from the British and German working classes.<sup>174</sup> Second, it deplores dogmatic ideology and seeks such goals as national independence and economic prosperity in pragmatic fashion. As Stanley Hoffman has observed, the Gaullist notion of grandeur is too unspecific to form the base for a coherent ideology.<sup>175</sup> As the object of a fundamental and continuing quest, it is Gaullism's functional equivalent to the British Labour Party's commitment to greater social equality. The nationalist appeal, which excludes no one, is well suited to unify large segments of the population.

Third, again like the catchall parties, the UDR accepts the framework of the existing social and political order; indeed, as the Democratic Union for the Republic, its interests are closely tied to the fate of existing political institutions. Fourth, its primary function tends to be to support (if not to nominate) national political leaders.

The UDR appears to depart from the catchall party type in two important ways. First, the skeptical attitude toward parties and interest groups which Gaullist leaders inherit from their mentor tends to inhibit the open, bargaining style of politics common in catchall parties. Organized interest groups are denied the access which they enjoy in most catchall parties.<sup>176</sup> With respect to the oligarchical character of its internal organization, and to the meager influence which it allows its backbenchers, the UDR is not radically different from the major parties in Great Britain and West Germany.<sup>177</sup> And yet it would seem that the Gaullist style is not one which allows the kind of frequent consultation, discussion, and bargaining which soften party oligarchy in Britain.

Like government parties everywhere, the UDR acts as a transmission belt between governors and governed; yet it tends to be a one-way communication, serving to inform and organize the electorate in support of government policies more than to express and digest demands from below. Although the evidence is still spotty, it appears likely that the oligarchical nature of the policy-making process in Gaullist France was one of the causes of those violent anti-Gaullist sentiments expressed by students and workers in May and June, 1968. De Gaulle's mid-crisis vision of a "society of participation" clearly would require major adjustments in the Gaul-

list political style, as well as in French authority patterns generally.<sup>178</sup>

Secondly, the UDR is dependent in a unique way upon de Gaulle's leadership. Although the modern British Conservatives owe much to Disraeli and the German CDU to Adenauer, these leaders rose *within* the party and were dependent upon its strength. De Gaulle rose to power before the UNR came into existence and subsequently refused to identify with the party which claimed him.

Despite Gaullism's claim to modernity, it might be argued that it is only a fleeting episode which, with the passing of de Gaulle, will be followed by yet another reversion to assembly government. If opinion surveys are taken as a guide, however, it seems clear that the institutional reforms which Gaullism has wrought have been generally well received, though there is some sentiment for restoring some of the importance of parliament (but not of political parties).<sup>179</sup> In April, 1962, 59 percent of all respondents in a national survey considered the governmental stability of the Fifth Republic to be a decided advantage, as against 15 percent who thought it disadvantageous.<sup>180</sup> In the fall of that same year, 33 percent of all respondents declared the institutions of the Fifth Republic to be "better" than those of the Fourth Republic, while 31 percent found them to be "approximately equal," and 13 percent to be "worse."<sup>181</sup> Popular approval of direct election of the president is much more universal. Since the old parties joined to wage war on de Gaulle over this reform in October, 1962, popular approval of the change has increased from 46 percent "yes" votes (out of all registered voters) in the fall of 1962 to 74 percent approval in May of 1964 — including 61 percent of all Communist voters and 70 percent of Socialist voters — to 78 percent approval in November, 1965.<sup>182</sup> To be sure, the hostility of mass opinion to the Third Republic, revealed in the referendum of October 21, 1945, did not prevent the resurrection of "Marianne" by the old "political class," which today remains largely aloof from the Fifth Republic. Even here, however, major figures like Gaston Defferre, Jean Lecanuet, and even François Mitterand seem eager to accept the new institutional framework, and thereby at long last to place the constitution around rather than within the political battlefield.<sup>183</sup> A recent study of political attitudes among a sample of French leaders in such fields as politics, the military, the civil service, business, communications, and the liberal professions revealed that a majority of this elite group were satisfied with the institutions of the Fifth Republic and expected them to survive, though with some modifications.<sup>184</sup>

If, then, the chances for survival of the formal institutional structure of de Gaulle's Republic are at least fair, can the same be said of the Gaullist party, without whose parliamentary majority the institutions, and particularly the Weimar-type dual executive, might work very differently? Are the common beliefs of Gaullists in national independence, governmental

stability, and modernization sufficient to counterbalance both their disunion over economic and social policies and the inevitable rivalries among their leaders? Although the number and complexity of the factors which bear on this question preclude a clearcut "yes" or "no" answer, it would appear useful to point up some of the advantages enjoyed by Gaullist party-builders and the problems which remain to be solved.

Elsewhere the emergence of catchall parties seems to have been associated with increasing social and political consensus; in France, a number of the old sources of conflict are at least beginning to lose their importance. Decolonization is all but complete, and cold war tensions have eased considerably. Catholic farmers now sometimes join with Communist farmers in defense of their mutual interests, as do Communist and non-Communist trade unions.<sup>185</sup>

Until the general strike of May and June, 1968, it appeared that a decade of sustained prosperity, accompanied by increasing concern with individual advancement and greater social and geographical mobility, was beginning to lessen class tensions.<sup>186</sup> That month of turmoil clearly demonstrated once again that general affluence is no guarantee of social harmony. And yet, in the main, French workers — unlike student activists — seemed most interested in achieving better material conditions within the existing social system.

Clearly the strikes and demonstrations of May, 1968, followed by a bitter electoral campaign, divided Frenchmen as nothing had done since the Algerian War. In the final analysis, however, student revolutionaries discovered they had little support outside the universities — certainly not from a Communist Party which disdained revolutionary "adventurers" and strove actively for a more responsible public image. The grievances of workers are mostly negotiable.

In comparison with the 1930's, and even the 1950's, when religion and foreign policy still aroused political passions, the issues which now divide Frenchmen are simpler and more susceptible to compromise solutions. In the terminology of La Palombara and Weiner, the "load" on the French party system has been reduced.<sup>187</sup> Though the Communist Party still commands the votes of a fifth of the French electorate, there are some signs that dogmatic ideologies and the parties that preach them are losing their appeal.<sup>188</sup> Never before have conditions in French society been as favorable to the emergence of a large, coalition party.

Through their control over the French government, at least for the moment Gaullists are capable of manipulating their institutional environment in order to favor the largest parties. Direct election of the president should provide at least a periodical incentive to form political coalitions. In December, 1966, the National Assembly adopted a government bill which requires

that a candidate for the National Assembly must win a vote equal to ten percent of the registered voters in his district in order to enter the runoff, rather than five percent of the actual vote, as previously required.<sup>189</sup> Premier Pompidou announced that the American and British type single ballot system might one day become "useful, indeed necessary" in France.<sup>190</sup>

Since politics in France, as elsewhere, is more than a simple reflection of the social and economic structure of society, the ultimate fate of large, coalition parties of the Gaullist type in France will depend in good measure upon the attitudes and behavior of political elites, both Gaullist and anti-Gaullist. On the opposition side, the emergence of a Center-Left coalition both broader and more stable than the present Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left would force Gaullists to unite or to face electoral disaster. There could be no better guarantee of Gaullist unity. To be sure, the strength and rigidity of the Communist Party presents a serious obstacle to unity of the Center-Left.

On the Gaullist side, should de Gaulle himself serve out his seven-year term, should he determine that political parties, more than institutions, were the key to continued political stability in France, and should he give greater attention and respect to the organization of the Gaullist movement, the present majority's potential for survival would be increased. De Gaulle's vigorous support for Gaullist candidates in the March, 1967, elections and his insistence that government ministers run for parliament on the Gaullist slate were both signs of increasing interest in party affairs. His replacement of Pompidou with Couve de Murville clearly demonstrated, however, that he was still unwilling to allow party leaders to interfere with Presidential government. Whatever de Gaulle may do, the fate of the Gaullist party will depend in good part upon the organizational and political skills of future party leaders.

Without de Gaulle, the UDR and its allies would indeed present a diverse coalition, but little more diverse, certainly, than the British Labour Party, and far less so than the American Democratic Party. If the experience of other catchall parties in the United States, Britain, and Germany is relevant, however, once having lost their arbiter, Gaullists will be able to maintain their grand coalition only if they demonstrate a capacity for compromise, only if they facilitate the expression and adjustment of demands. Those Gaullist leaders who share de Gaulle's disdain for intermediary groups and his distaste for consensus through compromise are poorly equipped for the political broker's role. The Gaullist conception of the national interest as a truth visible only to those who hold themselves aloof from the quarrels of selfish interests is one which lends itself very poorly to noncharismatic coalition building.<sup>191</sup> If leadership were to fall to men who cling to that conception — "Gaullistes de foi," Jean Charlot calls them —



the Gaullist party would face hard times indeed. It is likelier that leadership will fall to more pragmatic, more deeply political men like Georges Pompidou, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, and Roger Frey.<sup>192</sup>

Gaullism's suspicion of political parties and distaste for democratic politics also pose certain problems for the UDR when it envisions its role in the French party system — even were the opposition parties to accept the institutional framework of the Fifth Republic. If Gaullism incarnates the national interest, can there be such a thing as a loyal opposition? Indeed, both Roger Frey and Michel Debré often praise the two-party system, yet, like Georges Pompidou, and, in May, 1968, de Gaulle himself, they seek short term political gain by arguing that at present Frenchmen have a choice only between Gaullism and communism, thereby ignoring or implicating the UNR's numerous non-Communist rivals.<sup>193</sup> Or, alternatively, questioning the national loyalty of all rivals, Gaullist leaders tend to denounce "the old parties of the Left and of the Right," who are in "collusion with certain foreign forces desirous of bringing France back to that satellite status to which the regime which collapsed in 1958 had reduced it."<sup>194</sup> Even if the dream of Frey and Debré of a British-style two-party system were to materialize (and Communist strength and rigidity make a dualistic party system an unrealistic goal for the present), it is not yet clear that Gaullists would be prepared to accept a loyal opposition.

The survival of the Gaullist party as one of the major parties of France should be no difficult feat, given the accomplishments of the Gaullist period and the party organization already built. To preserve a Gaullist majority, however, will be more difficult. The gap between the extended and restricted electorates, the instability of party identification even within the latter, the incompleteness of party organization, the doubts of Gaullist leaders regarding the legitimacy of party government, their lack of agreement on economic policy, and their frequent bias against a politics of adjustment and compromise — all of these suggest problems that must be resolved if the UDR is to continue to realize its stated majoritarian vocation.

#### NOTES

1. As if to belie the touted stability of de Gaulle's France, the major Gaullist party has changed names as often as a pursued criminal. In December, 1962, the *Union pour la Nouvelle République* formally became the *Union pour la Nouvelle République-Union Démocratique du Travail* (UNR-UDT). In November, 1967, it changed again, as the result of absorption of new elements, to the *Union Démocratique pour la Ve République* (UD-Ve). In the June, 1968, elections, Gaullists campaigned under the label *Union pour la Défense de la République* (UDR). The party's group in the newly elected National Assembly rebaptised itself the *Union Démocratique pour la République*, retaining the campaign initials, UDR. At the time this paper goes to press, the party outside parliament remains the UD-Ve. Since past

experience suggests that the UDR label soon will be adopted for the whole party, this latter title will be used for the party as a whole, while "UD-Ve," when referring to the present, will be used only to designate the party structure outside parliament.

2. As quoted in *Le Monde* (hereinafter: *LM*), May 19, 1959.

3. For example, see Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs*, Vol. I, *The Call to Honor* (New York, 1955), pp. 79-80; Vol. III, *Salvation* (New York, 1960), pp. 272-276, 292-293, and 307-330; the Bayeux speech in Roy Macridis (ed.), *De Gaulle, Implacable Ally* (New York, 1966), pp. 41-43; *Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle* (New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Division, 1964), pp. 15, 191, 194, 197-199, 201-203, 209, and 246-249. Numerous other negative references to parties are to be found in such collections of his speeches as *Discours et messages, 1940-1946* (Paris, 1946); *La France sera la France* (Paris, 1947); and André Passeron, *De Gaulle Parle* (Paris, 1962).

4. *Discours et messages, 1940-1946* (Paris, 1946), pp. 721-727, as translated and reprinted in Macridis (ed.), *De Gaulle, Implacable Ally*, p. 41.

5. De Gaulle, *Salvation*, p. 9. See also Henry Ehrmann, "Direct Democracy in France," *American Political Science Review*, LVII, No. 4 (December, 1963), 883-901.

6. The relationship between de Gaulle and the MRP is carefully described in Mario Einaudi and François Goguel, *Christian Democracy in Italy and France* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1952), pp. 188-205. See also Philip Williams, *Crisis and Compromise* (Hamden, Conn., 1964), Chapters 8 and 10; and Gordon Wright, *The Reshaping of French Democracy* (New York, 1948), pp. 93-94, 132-134, and passim.

7. The RPF experience is described in Roy Pierce, "De Gaulle and the RPF — A Post-Mortem," *Journal of Politics*, XVI, No. 1 (February, 1954), 96-119; and in Williams, *Crisis and Compromise*, Chapter 10.

8. See his preelection address of November 7, 1962, in *Major Addresses, Statements, and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle*, pp. 201-203.

9. To the UNR Union of Vendée, Congress at Saint-Jean-des-Monts, as quoted in *LM*, November 5, 1963.

10. "Qu'est-ce que l'UNR-UDT?" supplement to *La Nation*, May 8, 1963, in pamphlet form.

11. "Pour une France Moderne," supplement to *La Nation*, May 8, 1964, p. 2, in pamphlet form.

12. Item I in a folder sent to all UNR candidates under the title, "Elections Cantonales des 8 et 15 mars 1964, Dossier du Candidat," (Paris: UNR-UDT national headquarters, 1964).

13. François Goguel, "La Signification de la consultation," in the report on "Les Elections municipales des 14 et 21 mars 1965," *Revue française de science politique*, XV, No. 5 (October, 1965), 911-912.

14. Jacques Baumel, "Le Gaullisme et son avenir," *Nouvelle Frontière*, V (January, 1964 [special issue entitled "Le Gaullisme"]), 36. See also, for example, J. Baumel, "Sachons épouser notre temps," *Notre République*, January 10, 1963; and Michel Eyraud, "L'Opposition dérouté," *La Nation*, December 3, 1963.

15. In a speech in Nantes, quoted in *Combat*, February 1, 1965.

16. René Caille, "A Problèmes nouveau, méthodes nouvelles," *Notre République*, January, 1963.

17. Jean Valleix, then UNR Departmental Secretary in Gironde, and now a deputy and assistant national UD-V<sup>e</sup> secretary, told me that the party found its best candidates among businessmen and managerial personnel in private industry, because

"ils ont fait leurs preuves." Interview, Bordeaux, July 28, 1965. See below for discussion of the attractions of *les cadres* to the UNR.

18. Paul Guillon, "Pour une école des cadres UNR-UDT," *Notre République*, March 1, 1963; and the reports by Pierre Vianson-Ponté in *LM*, July 6, 1966, and by André Passeron in *LM*, November 27-28, 1966.

19. The quoted phrase is from the editorial in *Notre République*, October 15, 1965.

20. Vol. I, *The Call to Honor*, p. 3.

21. (Paris, 1963), p. 273.

22. Edmond Michelet, *Le Gaullisme, Passionnante Aventure* (Paris, 1962), pp. 17-19, 141; Georges Pompidou to the UNR, *Conseil National*, meeting at Asnières in May, 1963, as quoted in *LM*, May 21, 1963; René Capitant, "L'U.N.R. et l'U.D.T.," *Notre République*, February 4, 1966; *Notre République*, April-May, 1966 (when editorials gave strong support to de Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO); and Léo Hamon (of the U.D.T.), interview, July 19, 1965.

23. *Premières Assises Nationales*, Bordeaux, November 13-15, 1959, "UNR, Résolutions adoptées par les Assises," a UNR publication (Paris, 1959), p. 1.

24. Interview with Léo Hamon, former senator and then a member of the UNR *Commission Politique*, July 19, 1965. On the same subject, see Louis Vallon, *Le Grand Dessein National* (Paris, 1964), pp. 71-86, 193-204; René Capitant, *Notre République*, February 4, 1966; Jacques Dauer, of the Front du Progrès, quoted in *LM*, May 17, 1966; and *LM*, October 11, 1966, reporting on the formation of the Convention de la Gauche V<sup>e</sup> République.

25. *Le Gaullisme, Passionnante Aventure*, p. 12. For a perceptive discussion of de Gaulle as a modernizer, see Peter Lamour, "De Gaulle and the New France," *Yale Review*, LV, No. 4 (Summer, 1966), 500-520.

26. "Pour une France Moderne," headline, p. 11.

27. April, 1959, to the *Association de la Presse Etrangère*, as quoted in *L'Année Politique*, 1959 (Paris, 1960), p. 44 (hereinafter: *AP*).

28. Jacques Baumel in a speech at Nantes, quoted in *Combat*, February 1, 1965.

29. Jacques Baumel, to the UNR Union of Vendée, Congress at Saint-Jean-des-Monts, November, 1963, as quoted in *LM*, November 5, 1963.

30. Jean-Claude Servan-Schreiber, "Au delà de l'UNR-UDT," *Notre République*, May 29, 1964.

31. Jean Bernasconi, to the Congress of the Union of the Loire, April 10, 1963, as quoted by Georges Lavau, "L'UNR-UDT au lendemain de sa victoire," *Revue française de science politique*, XIII, No. 2 (June, 1963), 441.

32. Debré, *Au Service de la Nation* (Paris, 1963).

33. *Premières Assises Nationales*, Bordeaux, November 13-15, 1959, "UNR, Résolutions adoptées par les Assises," p. 3. See also the declaration of the UNR deputies in favor of "une vraie démocratie sociale," quoted in *Combat*, December 11, 1962.

34. One articulate spokesman for the Gaullists of the Left is René Capitant. See, for example, his articles, "Vers la démocratie économique," *La Nouvelle frontière* (May, 1963), 5-10; "La Rentrée politique de Michel Debré," *Notre République*, July 12, 1963 (a review of Debré's book, *Au Service de la Nation*); and "Le Peuple a parlé," *Notre République*, March 17, 1967. See also the statement of Gilbert Grandval to the UNR *Conseil National*, in *LM*, May 21, 1963; Léo Hamon, "Nous ne sommes pas des conservateurs," *Notre République*, July 19, 1963; Albin Chalan-

don, in *LM*, November 27, 1958; and the chain of articles promoting profit-sharing legislation in 1966 and 1967 in *Notre République*.

35. *Sondages*, No. 2 (1963), 61. By April, 1965, the public image of the UNR was less firmly Rightist. At that time only 39 percent of persons sampled labelled it "Right," 23 percent as "Center," 3 percent as "Left," and 35 percent had no opinion. *Sondages*, No. 1 (1966), 41.

36. Among the Protestants are such leaders as Louis Vallon, Jacques Baume, Raymond Schmittlein, Maurice Couve de Murville, and (former Gaullist) Jacques Soustelle. Among the Jews is former minister Gaston Palewski. The UNR — like the RPF before it — receives numerous votes from Protestants in Alsace, which is one of its safest strongholds. See n. 68 below.

37. See Nicholas Wahl, "French Constitution of 1958, Part II, The Initial Draft and its Origins," *American Political Science Review*, LIII, No. 2 (June, 1959), 358-382.

38. On the "stalemate society," see Stanley Hoffmann's perceptive essay, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community," in Hoffmann et al., *In Search of France* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

39. See René Rémond, *La Droite en France* (rev. ed., Paris, 1963), pp. 279-292; and also by Rémond, "L'Enigme de l'U.N.R.," *Esprit*, No. 2 (February, 1963), 317-319.

40. Critics of the Left delight in pointing out that a number of prominent figures in the Fifth Republic (as in the Fourth, these critics need be reminded) have connections with big business and big finance. Georges Pompidou has been Director General of the Rothschild Bank in Paris. Couve de Murville is from a family of Marseilles bankers. Even Debré was once an administrator in a private firm, not to speak of the sympathies for big business entertained by Antoine Pinay and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. See, for example, "Qu'est-ce que l'U.N.R.?" *Tribune Socialiste*, April 28, 1962. See also Henry W. Ehrmann, "French Bureaucracy and Organized Interests," *Administrative Science Quarterly* (March, 1961), 534-555.

41. Interestingly enough, in April, 1966, the Communists refused to join the Socialists in censuring the government for its foreign policy. See René Capitant's welcome of their support, *Notre République*, April 27, 1966.

42. Quoted in *LM*, June 28, 1966.

43. In a perceptive analogy, Maurice Duverger sees de Gaulle as a modern-day Disraeli, whose role is to modernize conservatism. "A Man of the 19th or 20th Century?" in R. Macridis (ed.), *De Gaulle, Implacable Ally*, p. xx.

44. To the UNR *Conseil National*, meeting at Asnières in May, 1963, as quoted in *LM*, May 21, 1963.

45. P. 30.

46. A total of 227 out of the 465 deputies were found to have been either imprisoned by the Germans after the Armistice, or to have been involved in resistance activity. Mattei Dogan, "Changement de regime et changement de personnel," in *Le Référendum de septembre et les élections de novembre 1958* ("Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques," No. 109. Paris, 1960), pp. 256-259. This publication will be referred to hereinafter as *Elections 1958*.

47. Computations were made from *Who's Who in France* (Paris, 1963-1964 and 1965-1966 editions), and checked against the official lists of the *Compagnons de la Libération* and of the *Médaille de la Résistance*. The "other resistance medal" holders mentioned above held either the *Médaille de la France Libre* (3), or the *Croix du Combattant Volontaire de la Résistance* (11).

48. Jean Charlot, *L'Union pour la Nouvelle République: Etude du pouvoir au sein d'un parti politique* ("Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques," No. 153. Paris, 1967), pp. 207-254; 296-304. Hereinafter: *L'U.N.R.*

49. *Le Gaullisme, Passionnante Aventure*, p. 126.

50. So I was told by a young UNR deputy, who undoubtedly would prefer to go unnamed.

51. Charlot, *L'U.N.R.*, pp. 191, 204-205.

52. As against 11 percent who did not want new men and 22 percent who did not respond. Mattei Dogan in *Elections 1958*, p. 278, citing a national survey taken in September, 1958, by the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (IFOP).

53. *Elections 1958*, Table VII, p. 262.

54. Ibid., and Dogan in *Le Référendum d'octobre et les élections de novembre 1962* ("Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques," No. 142. Paris, 1965), p. 430. Hereinafter: *Elections 1962*.

55. Dogan notes, however, that the average age of *first election* was higher in 1958 than it had been under the Fourth Republic, when half of all deputies (as opposed to less than a third of the new UNR deputies in 1958) were first elected before the age of 40. Ibid., p. 271.

56. Computed — for deputies from France proper only — from République Française, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, *Annuaire Statistique de la France*, 1964, LXII, No. 12 (Paris, 1964), 121.

57. *Elections 1962*, p. 432.

58. *LM*, February 7, 1968.

59. Ibid.

60. Data following are from Dogan, *Elections 1962*, p. 431.

61. François Goguel, "Les élections législatives des 5 et 12 mars 1967," *Revue française de science politique*, XVII, No. 3 (June, 1967), 438. The figure for 1958 is for the UNR alone. Those for 1962 and 1967 include votes for "divers gaullistes" as well as for non-UNR members carrying the official Fifth Republic label (see below). Since there were Fifth Republic candidates in all districts in 1967, but not in 1962 (when 25 districts had no official Gaullist candidate), the total "restricted" Gaullist electorate was approximately the same size in those two elections.

62. A study sponsored by the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (FNSP) and carried out by IFOP. Reported in *Elections 1958*, p. 158.

63. *Elections 1962*, p. 230. Although studies of the March, 1967, elections were not yet available for analysis here, a national survey conducted in December, 1966, revealed that the proportion who intended to vote Gaullist on the first ballot was only very slightly greater among older voters. See M. Fichelet, R. Fichelet, G. Michelat and M. Simon, *Premiers Résultats d'un programme de recherche en psychosociologie politique: Les Français et le Parti communiste*, a reprint from *Cahiers du Communisme*, XII (December, 1967), and I (January, 1968), p. 14.

64. *Elections 1958*, p. 158; and *Elections 1962*, p. 228. For similar figures (52 percent women — 48 percent men) as of a few months before the 1967 election, see M. Fichelet et al., *Premiers Résultats*, p. 19.

65. *Elections 1962*, p. 202.

66. *Sondages*, No. 4 (1965), 36.

67. In support of this thesis, IFOP polls found that slightly more women than men (14% to 10.5%) shifted to de Gaulle between ballots of the presidential election. *Sondages*, No. 4 (1965), 21 and 36.



68. *Sondages*, No. 2 (1966), 15-19. On Protestant voting, see F. G. Dreyfus, in *Les Elections du 2 janvier 1956* ("Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques," No. 82. Paris, 1957), pp. 414-417; and *Elections 1962*, p. 361.

69. Fichelet et al., *Premiers Résultats*, p. 19.

70. *Elections 1958*, p. 158.

71. *Elections 1962*, p. 239.

72. Fichelet et al., *Premiers Résultats*, p. 16.

73. *Elections 1962*, p. 215. The majority of respondents classified as "*cadres supérieurs*" also declared a negative vote. They numbered only 65 out of a total sample of 1,515, however, making projections to the general electorate somewhat risky. In any case, the IFOP study of the 1965 presidential election found "*cadres supérieurs*" to favor de Gaulle in the second ballot by almost two to one. See *Sondages*, No. 4 (1965), 25.

74. *Sondages*, No. 4 (1965), 36. Though persons in the liberal professions generally supported de Gaulle, and though the educational level of Gaullist voters is slightly higher than that of non-Gaullists, the *université* — university students and teachers in public schools and universities — tends to be strongly anti-Gaullist. Of 71 teachers in the third National Assembly elected in 1967, only one joined the UD-V group (*LM*, Feb. 7, 1968).

75. *Elections 1958*, p. 146.

76. Until recently, one of the most serious problems of voting behavior research in France has been the tendency of Communist voters to refuse to declare their voting intentions (or past vote), or to misrepresent it. For example, in the legislative elections of November, 1958, only 4.4 percent of those respondents in a national survey who claimed to have voted declared they had voted Communist, as opposed to an actual Communist total vote of 14.3 percent of all eligible voters in the first ballot. Moreover, 37.9 percent of all respondents (some of whom probably had not voted at all) either refused to report their vote or claimed not to know how they voted (*Elections 1958*, p. 144). In the IFOP-FNSP study of the 1962 elections, however, those who refused to declare their vote were fewer (5.2%) and reported Communist votes (13.5%) were almost equal to actual Communist votes (14.5%) (*Elections 1962*, p. 217).

77. *Elections 1962*, p. 181.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

79. *Sondages*, No. 4 (1965), 31.

80. *Revue française de science politique*, XVII, No. 1 (February, 1967), 65-69.

81. The regional distribution of Gaullist votes is described in *Elections 1958*, pp. 361-371; *Elections 1962*, pp. 291-428 (including a number of regional studies); François Goguel, "L'Election présidentielle française de décembre 1965," *Revue française de science politique*, XVI, No. 2 (April, 1966), 221-254; Goguel, "Les Elections législatives des 5 et 12 mars 1967," *ibid.*, XVII, No. 3 (June, 1967), 446-449; and Goguel, "L'Electorat Gaulliste," *Nouvelle Frontière*, V (January, 1964), 25-31. For the June, 1968, elections, see the maps in *LM*, June 25, 1968.

82. Goguel in *Elections 1962*, pp. 297-298.

83. *Elections 1958*, p. 158; *Elections 1962*, p. 299; and *Sondages*, No. 4 (1964), 30.

84. In the absence of precise information, no attention has been given here to the 80,000 — 100,000 UNR members. A staff study done on 4,000 party members in Gironde, however, showed that men (62%) outnumbered women (38%), young

persons 15-35 years of age (28%) greatly outnumbered persons over 65 (17%), and workers (21%) and civil servants (21%) far outnumbered businessmen (12%) and liberal professional men (2%). (Unpublished UNR staff study, Union de la Gironde, Bordeaux, 1965.)

85. In cities of over 30,000, 684 UNR municipal councillors were elected (19 more than in 1959) out of a total of 5,524. In small cities and towns, where many candidates run without party label, the UNR share was considerably smaller. (*LM*, March 24, 1965, quoting official Ministry of Interior figures.)

86. The weakness of French party identification is demonstrated in Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVI, No. 1 (Spring, 1962), 1-23. In a SOFRES survey conducted in early 1966, 42 percent of those respondents who declared they would vote for a UNR candidate in the next election were classified as "marais," that is, having a low level of political interest. See Emeric Deutsch, Denis Lindon, and Pierre Weill, *Les Familles Politiques* (Paris, 1966), pp. 120-121. See also Angus Campbell, "A la recherche d'un modèle en psychologie électorale comparative," *Revue française de Sociologie*, VII (Numéro spécial 1966), 596.

87. "La vie politique de mai 1961 à septembre 1963," *Sondages*, No. 2 (1963), 59.

88. Deutsch, Lindon, and Weill, op. cit., pp. 46-53.

89. Alain Duhamel, "Le sondage de l'I.F.O.P.," *LM*, June 28, 1968; and "Les Elections législatives de mars 1967," *Sondages*, No. 3 (1967).

90. The formation and early history of the UNR are described by Charlot, *L'U.N.R.*, Chapter 1, and by Jacques Fauvet, "La Stratégie des formations politiques d'avril à novembre 1958," *Elections 1958*, pp. 15-19. See also *AP 1958*, pp. 129-150.

91. From the motion as quoted in *Elections 1958*, p. 18.

92. In an article by that title in the *Journal de Parlement*, summarized in *AP 1959*, p. 74.

93. Charlot, *L'U.N.R.*, pp. 58-59.

94. *Ibid.*, pp. 106-107. The pledge was as follows: "Elected Deputy of the UNR I confirm in a solemn manner my adherence to the Union for the New Republic and to its parliamentary group. Respectful of the mandate which was given me by the electors, I will abstain during the period of the legislature from participating in or becoming a member of any other group. I take the following engagement: to remain faithful to the objectives of the UNR, to support in Parliament and in my electoral district the action of General de Gaulle, to accept the discipline of voting as decided by the majority of the group for the important questions relating to the life of the nation and of the French community, in order to maintain the cohesion of our group and the general spirit of our movement." As quoted in Roy Macridis and Bernard Brown, *The De Gaulle Republic* (Homewood, Ill., 1960), p. 293n.

95. Thomazo, Delbecque, Brice, Arrighi, Souchal, Grasset, Cathala, Biaggi, and Battesti. *AP 1959*, pp. 119-121.

96. See reports in *LM*, November 14-21, 1959, and *AP 1959*, pp. 124, 133-135.

97. Premières Assises Nationales, Bordeaux, November 13-15, 1959, "UNR, Résolutions adoptées par les Assises" (Paris: printed by the UNR, 1959), p. 8.

98. Denis, from the Nord, and Laffin, from l'Yonne.

99. Charles Béraudier (Soustelle's replacement as deputy from the Rhône), Jean Mériot (Rhône), René Moatti (Seine), and Pierre Picard (Seine-et-Oise).

100. P. M. de La Gorce, "L'U.N.R., qui êtes-vous?" *L'Express*, April 28, 1960, p. 12; and *LM*, May 4, 1960. Jean Valleix, UNR Departmental Secretary in Gironde,

told me that the Soustelle expulsion produced his organization's worst time of trouble. Interview, July 28, 1965.

101. *AP* 1960, pp. 93 and 100.

102. Among them: Raymond Dronne, deputy from Sarthe, expelled in November, 1961; Jean Vittel, deputy from Var, resigned in December, 1961; and Guillaïn de Bénouville, deputy from Ille-et-Vilaine, expelled in June, 1962.

103. Albin Chalandon, quoted in *LM*, November 27, 1958; and *AP* 1959, pp. 3 and 133.

104. *La Nation*, April 29, 1961.

105. The membership figure of 2,000 is from former UDT Secretary-General Louis Vallon, in an interview reported in Robert Boulay, "Louis Vallon, ce gaulliste qui aime l'anarchie," *Paris-Presse*, December 21, 1962.

106. L. Vallon, quoting de Gaulle, in *ibid.* See also Charlot, *L'U.N.R.*, pp. 260-262.

107. Both Sainteny and Grandval were replaced in January, 1966, but the director of *Notre République*, General Pierre Billotte, was then named Minister of State for Overseas Departments and Territories.

108. Pisani resigned in April, 1967. See below, n. 167. Other members of the government appointed or reappointed in April, 1967, who might be identified with the Gaullists of the Left, in addition to Billotte, who was kept on, were Georges Gorse, a former Socialist and new Minister of Information, and Yves Guéna, Postal and Telecommunications Minister.

109. See, for example, Capitant's review of Debré's *Au Service de la Nation*, in *Notre République*, July 12, 1963.

110. The National Assembly passed the "Vallon Amendment" in 1965, calling upon the government to produce a legislative proposal on compulsory profit sharing. The measure was long delayed, then given to a special commission which reported negatively upon it in July, 1966. Debré subsequently referred to the Vallon Amendment as a "mythe diabolique," and Capitant and Vallon charged that the government, in deference to business interests, was trying to bury the entire proposal. See *Notre République*, May 27, 1966, September 30, 1966, November 4, 1966, and March 17, 1967; Jean-Claude Casanova, "L'Amendement Vallon," *Revue française de science politique*, XVII, No. 1 (February, 1967), 97-109; and *Journal Officiel, Lois et Décrets*, August 18, 1967 (text).

111. Vallon in *Notre République*, November 4, 1966; and Vallon to the Convention de la Gauche V<sup>e</sup> République, in *LM*, December 18-19, 1966. A possibility of a split is mentioned in René Capitant, "L'UNR et l'UDT," *Notre République*, February 4, 1966.

112. *Notre République*, March 17, 1967.

113. Excerpted in *LM*, November 11, 1967.

114. *LM*, January 27 and February 3, 1968.

115. Léo Hamon, former UDT leader, then member of the UNR Political Commission, in an interview, July 19, 1965.

116. For example, see his editorial, "Le Moment est venu," in *La Nation*, May 27, 1966, wherein he argues that Louis Vallon's profit-sharing scheme is rooted in "one of the fundamental principles of Gaullism," i.e., the association of labor and capital. See also his editorial in *La Nation* quoted in *LM*, January 7, 1966.

117. Buot, Capitant, Chalopin, Collette, Coumaros, Degraeve, Delong, Fossé, Gasparini, Hauret, Hinsberger, Le Douarec, Lepeu, Perrin, and Poncelot. Based upon the *Journal Officiel, Débats, Assemblée Nationale*, April 27 - June 26, 1965.

118. The party took no official stand on this bill. Roll call #191, May 5, 1965.
119. Roll calls 206, June 8, 1965; 208, June 11, 1965; and 214, June 22, 1965.
120. In a thorough roll-call analysis of the Assembly from 1962-1965, David Wood categorizes all UNR deputies and all but three Independent Republican deputies as "consistent supporters" of the government. See his "Majority Vs. Opposition in the French National Assembly, 1956-1965: A Guttman Scale Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, LXII, No. 1 (March, 1968), 104-107.
121. Marie-Christine Kessler, "M. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et les Républicains Indépendants," *Revue française de science politique*, XVI, No. 5 (October, 1966), 940-957; Marielle Bal, "Les Indépendants," *ibid.*, XV, No. 3 (June, 1965), 548-555; Kessler, "M. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et les Républicains Indépendants," *ibid.*, XVIII, No. 1 (February, 1968), 77-93; and the long excerpts from a press conference by Giscard d'Estaing in *LM*, January 12, 1967.
122. Kessler, *op. cit.*, p. 950; Bal, *op. cit.*, p. 549; and *Elections 1962*, Table, p. 430.
123. Press conference, reported in *LM*, July 3-4, 1965. Six months later Giscard defined the attitude of his group as "oui, mais," to which de Gaulle is said to have retorted, "On ne gouverne pas avec des mais..." *LM*, January 12, 1967.
124. *AP* 1963, p. 52.
125. Giscard, to a party meeting in Dijon, as quoted in *LM*, November 24, 1967.
126. He eventually gave in to the plan for single candidacies and won official approval for 85 Independent Republicans out of 486 Gaullist candidates. On Giscard's organizational activities, see Kessler, *op. cit.*
127. *LM*, August 19, 1967. For a disavowal of Giscard by the three Independent Republican ministers (Marcellin, Chamant, and Bettencourt), see *LM*, August 25, 1967. Marcellin later created an anti-Giscard Fédération des Républicains Indépendants in Brittany. *LM*, October 29-30, 1967.
128. Dissident Gaullist candidates, many running under the label "National Center for the Fifth Republic," won only .47 percent of the votes cast. François Goguel, "Les Elections législatives des 5 et 12 mars 1967," *Revue française de science politique*, XVII, No. 3 (June, 1967), 437.
129. De Gaulle's personal representative, Olivier Guichard, served as chairman of the Action Committee's subcommittee on investiture. In his press conference of October 28, 1966, de Gaulle said: "It is fully understood that, in order to compare ideas, draw up doctrines and finalize projects, debates are necessary. But from the moment that the majority takes its stand in the light of facts considered in this way, that the majority takes its stand in accordance with the State's other responsible bodies, any division stirred up within it, any divergence would be adverse and condemnable, for cohesion is the condition for stability and effectiveness, the *raison d'être* of our system of government, which the nation desired in the place of the inconsistency and impotency of the past." Gaullist candidates "...will be clearly united and will pledge to remain so in order to serve together in the Fifth Republic;..." "Full Text of the Fourteenth Press Conference held by French President Charles de Gaulle," p. 13.
130. Capitant, "Unité dan la diversité," *Notre République*, May 20, 1966.
131. The categories, of course, were delineated by Maurice Duverger in *Political Parties* (New York, 1959). They have been refined in an interesting fashion by Francis Sorauf in *Political Parties in the American System* (Boston, 1964), pp. 160-162.
132. François Goguel and Alfred Grosser estimate that in 1962 only some 500,000

out of 19,000,000 voters were members of any party. The UNR membership (then estimated at 60,000) was as large as that of any party other than the Communist Party, then estimated at 300,000. *La Politique en France* (Paris, 1964), p. 106. Though in its propaganda the UNR has claimed as many as 150,000 members ("Pour une France Moderne"), Claude Labbé, UNR *Secrétaire Général Adjoint pour l'Organisation et l'Implantation*, told me on August 19, 1965, that membership was then about 100,000. Actual paid membership at any one time is probably slightly less (see Charlot, *L'U.N.R.*, p. 116).

133. *AP* 1959, p. 89; and Macridis and Brown, *The De Gaulle Republic*, pp. 294-295.

134. Rémond, in *Esprit*, No. 2 (February, 1963), pp. 309-311.

135. Charlot, "Note sur les dirigeants de l'U.N.R.," pp. 1-3. Charlot explores the party's oligarchical character in detail in *L'U.N.R.*, especially Chapters 8, 9, and 12.

136. *LM*, November 26-27, 1967.

137. Interview with Léo Hamon, a member of the *Commission Politique*, July 19, 1965.

138. Quoted in *France-Observateur*, March 23, 1961. Of course, the power of congresses is not much greater in British parties, as R. T. McKenzie shows in his *British Political Parties* (New York, 1963).

139. Baumel's predecessors: Roger Frey, Albin Chalandon, Jacques Richard, Roger Dusseaulx, and Louis Terrenoire.

140. Most of the information presented here on internal party organization is taken from interviews with Claude Labbé, then UNR *Secrétaire Général Adjoint pour l'Organisation et l'Implantation* (August 19, 1965) and with Bernard Le Calloch, then Director of the UNR-UDT national *Section de Documentation* (July 21, 1965).

141. Interviews, Labbé and Le Calloch. The rebellion in Herrault is described in Brigitte Gros, "Pour qui sont ces statuts?" *L'Express*, January 30, 1964. See also *L'Express*, November 21, 1963. The Gard dissolution is reported in *Combat*, May 11, 1963.

142. *LM*, February 22, 1968.

143. In a circular for intraparty use, quoted in *Aux Ecoutes*, June 24, 1965, p. 11.

144. Roger Frey, interview, July 8, 1965.

145. For a lively description of the political style of Chaban-Delmas, see Pierre Vianson-Ponté, *Les Gaullistes* (Paris, 1963), pp. 87-92.

146. Interviews with Jean Valleix, UNR Departmental Secretary for Gironde, and with Robert Vironneau, an able young mayor of the town of Guide in the district of Blaye. Bordeaux, July 28, and July 29, 1965.

147. Joël Le Theule, interview, Sablé, July 7, 1965.

148. Charlot, *L'U.N.R.*, pp. 129-136.

149. As quoted in *LM*, March 2, 1965. In an interview, July 8, 1965, Frey seemed to have the impression that British and American parties were fundamentally alike in their organization, and that both were more highly organized and disciplined than the UNR.

150. He discussed it with Michel Debré and Jacques Chaban-Delmas. (Interview with Frey, July 8, 1965.) For speculation in the press on friction between Frey and Baumel (much of it probably inaccurate), see Claude Krief, "Un barron dans le vent," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, March 6, 1965; Hector de Galand, "De Gaulle lâche l'U.N.R.," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, March 18, 1965; and *LM*, November 26, 1963 (at the Nice *Assises*).



151. Interview, August 19, 1965. A similar view was expressed in a meeting of UNR departmental secretaries, reported in *LM*, January 25, 1966.

152. See de Gaulle's approving comments on the work of the Lille Congress in his November, 1967, press conference, in *LM*, November 29, 1967.

153. Article 16, Section f, in *Conseil National*, U.N.R., "Reglement Intérieur," (Paris: UNR, 1958), mimeo., p. 6.

154. Joël Le Theule, interview, July 7, 1965.

155. Relations between the government and the Senate have been even worse; yet the government's habit of ignoring and bypassing the Senate has reduced that body to relatively minor importance.

156. In an interview in *Entreprise*, quoted in *AP* 1960, p. 81.

157. *J.O., Déb., Ass. Natl.*, July, 1961, p. 1480, as quoted in Philip M. Williams, *The French Parliament* (New York, 1968), p. 62. See also Lavau in *Revue française de science politique*, June, 1963, p. 435; Chaban-Delmas' remarks to the 1961 National Congress, quoted in *LM*, March 21, 1961; and his statement at the end of the spring, 1965, parliamentary session, quoted in *LM*, July 2, 1965. Though an influential figure in his own right in party and government circles, Chaban-Delmas (a most skilled politician) may criticize the government from time to time partly to bolster his position within the National Assembly.

158. *LM*, September 24, 1961.

159. *Ibid.*

160. *Ibid.* For an earlier criticism from Schmittlein, see *LM*, February 12-13, 1961.

161. *La Nation*, April 29, 1961.

162. See Raymond Schmittlein's letter to UNR deputies on this problem, quoted in *LM*, September 24, 1961, and the letter by UNR deputy Achille Peretti, in *LM*, July 27, 1963.

163. Pompidou, interview in *Notre République*, February 22, 1963.

164. Charlot, *L'U.N.R.*, pp. 143-184; and Williams, *The French Parliament*, pp. 102-109.

165. All of the UNR deputies whom I interviewed testified to Rey's skills as a peacemaker.

166. According to Christian de La Malène, former minister and deputy from the Seine, the decisions of the *bureau* were never reversed by the UNR caucus, which in the second Assembly usually was attended by only a third of all UNR deputies. The *bureau* was partially elected by the caucus and partially composed of UNR representatives of Assembly committees. De La Malène, interview, July 9, 1965; and Le Theule, interview, July 7, 1965.

167. See Pisani, "Sur une démission," *LM*, May 13, 1967.

168. See the excerpts from Giscard d'Estaing's statement to the National Assembly during the debate over delegated powers in *LM*, May 23, 1967; and Chalandon, interview in *L'Express*, September 10-16, 1967.

169. *LM*, June 30, 1967.

170. The UNR held 7 of 27 cabinet posts as of January 1, 1959; 10 of 27 as of August 24, 1961; 12 of 25 as of May 17, 1962; and 15 of 28 as of January 10, 1966. *LM*, May 18, 1962 and January 11, 1966.

171. The four members of the government who did not join one of the two Gaullist parliamentary groups were: Couve de Murville and Messmer, both of whom clearly would have joined the UD-Ve had they been elected, and the two ministers who had not been candidates, André Malraux and Jean-Marcel Jeanneney.

172. On the "end of ideology," see the exchange between Joseph La Palombara and Seymour Lipset in the *American Political Science Review*, LX, No. 1 (March, 1966), 5-18, 110-111. See also François Mauriac, *De Gaulle* (Paris, 1964), whose sole regret regarding de Gaulle is that Gaullism seems to be focused mainly on material progress (pp. 341, 344-345).

173. The concept of the "catchall" party is developed in Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," in Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, 1966), pp. 177-200. On the increasing resemblance between European and American parties, see also Leon Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies* (New York, 1967).

174. D. E. Butler and Anthony King, *The British General Election of 1964* (London, 1964), p. 296; Robert Alford, *Party and Society* (Chicago, 1963), pp. 348-349; and Arnold Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany* (2d ed., New York, 1966), p. 108.

175. Stanley Hoffmann, "De Gaulle's Memoirs: The Hero in History," *World Politics*, XIII, No. 1 (October, 1960), 145.

176. I would agree with Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell (*Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* [Boston, 1966]) that the catchall party contributes to interest aggregation. Even in Britain, however, the parties' search for the maximum number of votes results in campaign pronouncements so vague that the real task of compromising conflicting demands is left to ministers and civil servants. Nonetheless, the American, British, and German catchall parties do provide channels of access through which interests may make their case to parliamentary and governmental leaders. On this question see Howard A. Scarrow, "The Function of Political Parties: A Critique of the Literature and the Approach," *Journal of Politics*, XXIX, No. 4 (November, 1967), 782; Samuel Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* (New York, 1965), especially Chapter 12; and Samuel Eldersveld, "American Interest Groups," in Henry W. Ehrmann (ed.), *Interest Groups on Four Continents* (Pittsburgh, 1958), pp. 173-196.

177. McKenzie, *British Political Parties*; and Gerhard Loewenberg, *Parliament in the German Political System* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1966), especially Chapter 6.

178. On authority patterns in French society, see Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago, 1964); and Stanley Hoffmann, "Heroic Leadership: The Case of Modern France," in Lewis J. Edinger (ed.), *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies* (New York, 1967), pp. 108-154.

179. *Sondages*, No. 3 (1964), "Les Institutions et la vie politique," pp. 35-36.

180. *Ibid.*, No. 2 (1963), "La Vie politique de mai 1961 à septembre 1963," p. 85.

181. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

182. *Ibid.*, No. 3 (1964), "La Vie politique d'octobre 1963 à octobre 1964," p. 13; and *ibid.*, No. 4 (1965), Michel Brule, "Les Français et le mandat présidentiel," p. 44.

183. See Mitterand's statement to the *Assises de la Convention des Institutions Républicaines*, in *LM*, March 26, 1968. On the importance of achieving a constitutional consensus, see the perceptive articles of René Capitant, "Fonder une république ou fonder un parti?" and "La Structure de la majorité," in *Notre République*, February 11 and 18, 1966.

184. Karl W. Deutsch et al., *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (New York, 1967), pp. 41, 44-56.

185. Lawrence Wylie, "Social Change at the Grass Roots," in Hoffmann et al., *In*

*Search of France*, pp. 198-199; and Gérard Adam, "L'Unité d'action C.G.T.-C.F.T.D.," *Revue française de science politique*, XVII, No. 3 (June, 1967), 576-590. On the decline of religion as a political issue, see also François Goguel, "Religion et politique en France," *Revue française de science politique*, XVI, No. 6 (December, 1966), 1174-1176.

186. On social change in contemporary France, see the study edited by the Société française de sociologie, *Tendances et volontés de la société française* (Paris, 1966); Georges Dupeux, *La Société Française, 1789-1960* (Paris, 1964); and Hoffmann et al., *In Search of France*. On social change in Europe generally, see the articles by Seymour Martin Lipset and Ralf Dahrendorf in *Daedalus*, Winter, 1964.

187. *Op. cit.*, pp. 3-42.

188. See Goguel and Grosser, *op. cit.*, p. 106, on the decline of party memberships, and *La Dépolitisation, Mythe ou Réalité?* ("Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques," No. 120. Paris, 1962) — especially pp. 280-282, on the transfer of political activity from partisan to nonpartisan associations.

189. *J.O., Déb., Ass. Nat.*, December 8, 1966, pp. 5310-5352. The ten percent barrier in fact eliminated over six hundred opposition candidates, but only two official Gaullist candidates after the first ballot of the legislative elections on March 5, 1967. Philip M. Williams and David B. Goldey, "The French General Election of 1967," *Parliamentary Affairs*, XX, No. 3 (Summer, 1967), 217.

190. *J. O., Déb., Ass. Nat.*, December 8, 1966, p. 5322. The German coalition formed in November, 1966, also agreed to an eventual amendment of the electoral system in order to eliminate minor parties.

191. See the interesting and critical comments on the Gaullist view of national interest in François Goguel (a Gaullist Secretary-General of the Senate, as well as an eminent political scientist) and Alfred Grosser, *La Politique en France*, pp. 247-248.

192. Charlot, *L'U.N.R.*, Chapter 11.

193. For example, see Frey's statement quoted in *LM*, November 26, 1963; his speech to the UNR "Conférence d'Information" at Asnières in late February, 1965, printed by the UNR, pp. 2-10; Pompidou's speech to the Lille Congress, in *LM*, November 28, 1967; and the numerous statements of Gaullist leaders quoted in *LM*, June 1-30, 1968.

194. From the declaration of UNR deputies meeting at Beaulieu-sur-Mer, quoted in *La Nation*, September 23, 1963. The same theme — aimed as much at supposed American puppets as at Russian puppets — was repeated frequently in *La Nation* prior to the presidential election of December, 1965, and again in April, 1966, when a motion of censure against the government was being debated.